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ABSTRACT 
 
The last two decades have witnessed various governance initia-
tives across institutions, domestic and international, in response to 
mushrooming regulatory trade barriers.  Among the efforts to bal-
ance regulatory autonomy and international cooperation, “regula-
tory coherence” or “good regulatory practices” seems a promising 
solution that centers upon bottom-up domestic regulatory rational-
ization.  While existing literature has documented how recent 
mega-regional trade blocs seek to harness regulatory barriers 
through mechanisms of international cooperation, it has arguably 
overlooked certain crucial issues.  In particular, how has regulatory 
coherence emerged as a new global norm vis-à-vis the default in-
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ternational economic and legal order? What are the limits to the 
global normative diffusion of regulatory coherence when consider-
ing the diverse contexts and agendas of emerging economies, most 
notably China? 
This article aims to contribute the existing scholarship by mak-
ing two major claims.  First, built upon a historical approach, this 
paper traces the trajectory of the development of regulatory coher-
ence.  With the United States being the primary driving force, the 
concept of regulatory coherence mirrors the key elements of Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and has diffused across various juris-
dictions through multiple venues, like the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment.  Yet, despite its penetration, the entrenchment of regu-
latory coherence as a new global norm is conditioned upon com-
plex political economy issues, particularly the role of China.  By 
exploring the evolution of legal and political underpinnings for the 
past decades, this article contends that China has taken what we 
describe an “experimental approach” by prudently addressing 
regulatory coherence at both domestic and international levels, 
largely due to the democratic implications of regulatory reforms.  
Such an approach may in the end define the boundary of regulato-
ry coherence as an emerging global norm. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past few decades, global governance has received 
considerable attention from scholars working in various concentra-
tions.  International lawyers and political scientists have addressed 
vast increases—in reach as well as form—of cooperative mecha-
nisms transcending national borders by using various theoretical 
frameworks, including transgovernmental networks, global ad-
ministrative law, informal international lawmaking, and transna-
tional private regulations.  In the same vein, and in part driven by 
the ramifications of heterogeneous regulatory approaches, interna-
tional economic law scholars have been devoted to exploring new 
ways to facilitate international regulatory cooperation through 
trade and investment treaties.  While these scholars embrace vari-
ous routes, they share common goals regarding regulation:  the re-
duction of obstacles, the enhancement of legitimacy and accounta-
bility, and the promotion of compatibility among regulatory efforts 
at various levels. 
The concept of regulatory coherence manages the ramifications 
of diversified regulatory approaches through rationalizing domes-
tic regulatory processes.  Diverging regulations in states and their 
cross-border implications represent a sphere of scholarly attention 
and intellectual discourse in international economic law.  While 
neoliberalism-embedded globalization and economic development 
have largely defined the world order over the past few decades, 
they have also fueled tensions between international cooperation 
and regulatory autonomy.  For many, divergent regulatory ap-
proaches reflect the results of diverse cultural, economic, and polit-
ical endowments in different countries and fall squarely within the 
scope of national sovereignty.  For others, however, they may sim-
ultaneously constitute non-tariff barriers (NTBs) that serve protec-
tionist purposes.  While the World Trade Organization (WTO) in-
troduces a set of proxies (e.g., necessity test, international standard, 
and scientific evidence) in its covered agreements—notably, the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agree-
ment on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS)—there are salient limitations,1 largely due to the incapacity 
                                                   
1  See e.g., Robert W. Saiger & Alan O. Sykes, International Trade, National 
Treatment, and Domestic Regulation, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 149 (2011) (arguing that the 
WTO legal framework does little to address excessive nondiscriminatory regula-
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of such institutional designs to go beyond merely scratching the 
surface of regulatory divergences by addressing regulatory outputs 
and their trade implications. 
This is where the normative construction of regulatory coher-
ence enters in by addressing regulatory inputs, as demonstrated by 
the institutional design embraced by recent mega-regional agree-
ments such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)2 and the Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).3  TPP and TTIP in-
corporated “good regulatory practices” that anchor United States 
administrative law4 and that have also been endorsed by the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).5  
While these developments appear to indicate the emergence of 
regulatory coherence as the new global norm, it remains unclear 
whether and to what extent such a norm can go hand in hand with 
emerging economies, in particular China.  Although China’s legal 
system has witnessed a sea change during the post-WTO era, its 
regulatory interventions from time to time have been characterized 
as protectionist because of the inadequate level of transparency, 
stakeholder participation, and third-party review throughout the 
decision-making process.  While forging key elements of regulato-
ry coherence (such as transparency and public consultation, regu-
latory impact analysis, interagency coordination and compatibility, 
and administrative and judicial review) in the form of new global 
rules may brush away fears regarding China’s beggar-thy-
neighbor policy, these requirements may also place new pressures 
on Chinese leaders by enabling stakeholders—both foreign and 
domestic—to have a say in the rulemaking process at a much earli-
                                                                                                                   
tions). 
2  Trans-Pacific Partnership, N.Z. Ministry of Foreign Aff. & Trade (not yet in 
force), ch. 25, https://mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaties/trans-
pacific-partnership-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership 
[https://perma.cc/32QC-ZBM], [hereinafter TPP]. 
3  Council Directive 11103/13 of 17 June 2013, Directives for the negotiation 
on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Un-
ion and the United States of America, 11–12, 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4EN5-HR5Y]. 
4  There is no universally agreed upon definition of the term “good regulato-
ry practices.”  For the present purpose, we loosely refer to “regulatory coherence” 
and “good regulatory practices” interchangeably. 
5  See infra Part II.B. 
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er stage and to a much greater extent than what is required by the 
WTO.  At a deeper level, regulatory coherence may entail a trans-
formation of domestic regulatory processes and institutions in 
China, requiring more rigorous forms of democratic accountability 
and rule of law.   
Will China embrace regulatory coherence as the new bench-
mark for the twenty-first century?  How does regulatory coher-
ence—a concept drawn from the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition—fit 
into China’s existing regulatory infrastructure, as well as its eco-
nomic, political, and social context?  Will path dependence lead 
China in a different direction?  Given the United States’ withdraw-
al from TPP under President Trump,6 China’s approach would 
presumably have implications for the way in which regulatory bar-
riers are managed in mega-regionalism—which may in turn spill 
over into multilateralism through the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the massive “One Belt, One 
Road” (OBOR) Initiative, other emerging pillars of global trade 
governance.7  Notwithstanding its significance, however, the role 
of China in this regard has been largely left untouched in the grow-
ing body of literature on regulatory coherence and cooperation.8  
This article seeks to broaden the debate by addressing the ramifica-
tions of international regulatory cooperation for China—and vice 
versa. 
This article argues that, despite the emergence of global regula-
tory coherence, its real impact is contingent upon diverse contexts 
in different countries, among which China’s unique circumstances 
pose numerous obstacles to both its regulatory systems and the fu-
ture of international cooperation.  While China’s current system 
has substantial institutional infrastructure in theory, in practice 
                                                   
6  Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The United States 
Officially Withdraws from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2017/january/US-Withdraws-From-TPP [https://perma.cc/QZV8-
J34M]. 
7  Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership, Austl. Dep’t of Foreign Aff. & Trade (Aug. 30, 2012), 
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/rcep/Documents/guiding-
principles-rcep.pdf [https://perma.cc/UX5G-T79M];  Alexious Lee, A Brilliant 
Plan: One Belt One Road, CREDIT LYONNAIS SECURITIES ASIA (2015), 
https://www.clsa.com/special/onebeltoneroad/ [https://perma.cc/M9ED-
N7DD]. 
8  For a notable exception, see Henry Gao, TPP, Regulatory Coherence and Chi-
na’s Free Trade Strategy from A to Z, 7 EUR. Y.B. INT’L. ECON. L. 507 (2016).  
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some fundamental flaws persist and shape development of regula-
tory coherence in the country and beyond.  China seems to have 
adopted an “experimental approach” with prudent engagement of 
regulatory coherence both at domestic and international levels.  
This approach provides ample opportunities to map the emerging 
contours of global regulatory coherence and its limits. 
This article proceeds with Part 1, by exploring the origins, de-
velopment, and key elements of regulatory coherence.  Part 2 ana-
lyzes the emergence and global normative diffusion of this move-
ment as the new rule of the game, especially in the recent mega-
regional agreements vis-à-vis the ground rules set by the WTO’s 
multilateral trading system.  Part 3 traces the transformation of 
China’s administrative law through the pre- and post-WTO eras.  
Despite reforms, the gap between the law on the books and the law 
in action remains.  Part 4 identifies potential limits inherent in the 
legal infrastructure of China, considering the underlying political, 
economic, social, and cultural contexts.  Such limits mirror China’s 
recent approaches to regulatory coherence in the sphere of eco-
nomic integration and may in turn shed light on the future devel-
opment of global regulatory coherence.  Part 5 concludes. 
 
2.  THE ERA OF MEGA-REGIONALISM:  THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL 
REGULATORY COHERENCE 
2.1.  The Concept of Regulatory Coherence 
 
The past decade has witnessed a growing push for the inclu-
sion of additional requirements to promote regulatory coherence in 
trade and investment agreements at the bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral levels.9  Regulatory coherence obligations have been 
contemplated as part of the shift from traditional and easily recog-
nizable barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, to domestic regulations 
and “behind the border” measures that effectively constitute non-
tariff barriers to international trade.10  Indeed, the multilateral rules 
                                                   
9  See Elizabeth Sheargold & Andrew D. Mitchell, The TPP and Good Regulato-
ry Practices: An Opportunity for Regulatory Coherence to Promote Regulatory Autono-
my? 15 WORLD TRADE REV. 587 (2016) (noting that chapters relating to regulatory 
cooperation are likely to appear more frequently in new preferential trade agree-
ments). 
10  See ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
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under the WTO appear to be successful in addressing discrimina-
tory measures but fall short in addressing inefficient, unclear, re-
dundant—yet non-discriminatory—regulations that are burden-
some on trade in goods and services.11  While demand for 
regulatory coherence may be high during efforts to reduce non-
tariff barriers to trade and forge deeper economic integration by 
addressing unclear, non-transparent, inefficient, or duplicative 
regulations under the purview of international economic law, the 
concept of regulatory coherence has domestic (or more precisely, 
American) origins that are steeply embedded in democratic ac-
countability and the rule of law.  
 
2.1.1.  The American Origins of Regulatory Coherence 
 
The contemporary genesis of regulatory coherence can be 
traced back to the United States’ Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), enacted by Congress in 1946.12  The APA established the le-
gal infrastructure of the “administrative state”13 in the United 
States, establishing the fundamental principles and procedures in 
relation to the nature and enforcement of administrative law in the 
country.14  From a historical perspective, the APA was created dur-
ing a politically contentious, post-New Deal period when Congress 
was concerned about the expanding powers of the new federal 
agencies created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, beginning in 
                                                                                                                   
DIPLOMACY 232 (2nd ed. 1990); ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER 
NEOLIBERALISM 169–70 (2011);  Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—and 
Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94, 101 
(2002);  Alan O. Sykes, The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in Internation-
al Goods and Services Markets, 2 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 49 (1999). 
11  See Robert W. Saiger & Alan O. Sykes, International Trade and Domestic 
Regulation 43 (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 387, 2009) 
(explaining how inefficiently stringent standards may emerge under certain cir-
cumstances even if regulatory discrimination is prohibited). 
12  Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter APA], Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 
Stat. 237 (1946). 
13  For a comprehensive discussion on the development of the “administra-
tive state” in the U.S., see generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical 
Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986);  Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation, 
Incorporating the Administrative Process, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998);  Elena Kagan, 
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001). 
14  See generally PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS (11th ed. 2011). 
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1933.15  With the enactment of the APA, Congress arguably struck a 
legislative balance to discipline, standardize, and oversee these 
federal agencies.  This balance evolved over time due to the appli-
cation and interpretation of the Act by courts, the adoption of sub-
sequent laws concerning relevant issues by Congress, and the 
management and practical use of the APA through Presidential 
Executive Orders.16 
The philosophy governing American administrative law stipu-
lates that only Congress may enact laws and delegate powers to 
the executive branch, which makes rules to enforce the law.17  
Therefore, when a federal agency crafts regulations, its power is 
derived from a statutory command and is exercised in accordance 
with applicable APA principles and procedures to ensure the legal-
ity and rationality of those regulations.  As such, administrative 
law requirements include, inter alia, transparency and public con-
sultation, regulatory impact analysis, interagency coordination and 
compatibility, and ex-post scrutiny of judicial or administrative re-
view, which also constitute integral elements of the contemporary 
concept of regulatory coherence.  
 
2.1.2.  Transparency and Public Consultation 
 
The idea of transparency in American administrative law is re-
flected in the new legal terrain connected to the expanding role of 
                                                   
15  Since 1933, several federal agencies were created pursuant to the new 
statutes enacted by the Democratic Congress and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
as part of the New Deal legislative plan to address the social and economic chal-
lenged faced by the U.S. after the Great Depression.  Some argue that the oppo-
nents as well as the supporters of President Roosevelt fought over the passage of 
the APA "in a pitched political battle for the life of the New Deal," involving a ten-
year period of "painstaking and detailed study and drafting."  See George Shep-
ard, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Pol-
itics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996);  DANIEL E. HALL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY 2–10 (5th ed. 2011);  Administrative Procedure Act, 
H.R. JUDICIARY COMM. REP. NO. 79–1989 (1946). 
16  See generally STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 14; OECD, Pilot Database on Stake-
holder Engagement Practices, http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-
policy/pilot-database-on-stakeholder-engagement-practices.htm 
[https://perma.cc/H8CL-AL72] (illustrating how countries have implemented 
recommendations for regulatory policy and governance);  see also the discussion 
infra in this Part on several Executive Orders issued by different U.S. presidents. 
17  U.S. CONST. art. I, §§1, 8;  see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 175 F.3d 1027 (1999).   
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government with discrete and limited regulatory measures enacted 
during the New Deal era.18  The APA, with few exceptions, allows 
two procedural venues for creating regulations: an on-the-record, 
trial-like approach that is rarely employed these days;19 and a less 
formal, commonly utilized “notice and comment rulemaking” pro-
cess,20 which is the rulemaking process conventionally referred to 
by scholars and practitioners.21  While both procedures stress the 
transparency requirement, the latter features a structured set of 
general obligations pertaining to public consultation.  With regard 
to transparency and public consultation in the rulemaking process, 
the APA requires “general notice of proposed rulemaking” to be 
published in the Federal Register: 
After notice . . . the agency shall give interested persons an 
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through sub-
mission of written data, views, or arguments with or with-
out opportunity for oral presentation.  After consideration 
of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorpo-
rate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of 
their basis and purpose.22  
Specifically, a federal agency is required to publish a notice of 
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, which includes the 
draft regulatory text, a preamble explaining the need for the rule, 
and a summary of factual and scientific bases for the rule, to advise 
various potential stakeholders of the issues involved so they may 
respond with comments, data, or other arguments.23  The agency 
                                                   
18  Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. 
& FOR. AFF. 1, 2 (1998) (discussing U.S. leadership in using domestic administra-
tive law to shape a transparent international trade system). 
19  See United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court’s marginalization of formal, trial-like rulemaking pro-
cess in 1972);  see also APA, §§556–57 (addressing the agency’s obligations when 
conducting proceedings, investigations, and reviews). 
20  5 U.S.C. §553. 
21  See Robert W. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Ap-
plicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1276, 1312–13 (1972) (discussing the procedural notice and comment rule 
making process under U.S. administrative law). 
22  See 5 U.S.C. §553 (b) and (c) (requiring general notice of a rulemaking pro-
posal to be published in the Federal Register by publicly issuing a statement of 
basis and purpose).  
23  See generally DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 31–35 (1947) (discussing the historical materials 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/4
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considers the information and comments received while forming 
its decision to finalize, revise, or withdraw the proposed rule.24  Af-
ter the public consultation process is completed, the agency is re-
quired to publish the final regulation accompanied by reasoned re-
sponses of the regulatory agency to the comments received (which 
together constitute part of the object for potential judicial review) 
in the Federal Register, which usually enters into force in 30 to 60 
days.25 
The objective of the transparency and public consultation re-
quirement is to apprise all interested persons of the general pur-
pose and basis of the rule, provide adequate participation and pro-
tection of private interests, and facilitate informed, rational, 
coherent, and legal administrative action.26  This institutional de-
sign, with its high level of transparency, reflects the United States’ 
common law heritage—with roots in the American Revolution and 
intended to ensure against overaccumulation of power—the checks 
and balances established through the three branches of the gov-
ernment, the changing relationship between the administrative 
state and interest group representation, and the contemporary 
reformation of administrative law.27 
 
2.1.3.  Regulatory Impact Analysis 
 
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12291 
partly in response to growing concerns about the regulatory state 
and its power, thereby implementing the concept of the regulatory 
impact analysis (RIA), which has been embraced as a key element 
                                                                                                                   
regarding notice-and-comment rulemaking after the APA’s enactment for the ref-
erence of other federal agencies). 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  See Alan Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Respon-
sive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 256–58 (1986) (discussing how federal agencies need-
ed to create fact-gathering procedures because the rule-making process was not 
meeting the demands of fact-based policies). 
27  See Ostry, supra note 18, at 4–5 (discussing how U.S. administrative law 
influenced the formation of GATT through its historical formation and its unique 
structural characteristics of independent regulatory agencies);  see also Richard B. 
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 
(1975) (discussing the development and disintegration of the traditional model of 
American administrative law). 
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of “good regulatory practices,”28 in order to “reduce the burdens of 
existing and future regulations, increase agency accountability for 
regulatory actions, provide for presidential oversight of the regula-
tory process, minimize duplication and conflict of regulations, and 
insure well-reasoned regulations.”29  The Executive Order provid-
ed that “[r]egulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the po-
tential benefits to society from the regulation outweigh the poten-
tial costs to society.”30  In addition, agencies were required to 
prepare regulatory impact analyses of all major rules and submit 
them to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review.31  
While debated and criticized,32 Executive Order 12291 essentially 
forged the concept of regulatory impact analysis, and in particular 
cost-benefit analysis, as a central element of rulemaking that gen-
erally applies at the federal level.  The embedding of RIA in the 
rulemaking processes, and more broadly, public policy develop-
ment, was a response to increased demand for democratic control 
by constituents, motivated by various interests that have different 
stakes in and diverse approaches to the administrative process. 
 
2.1.4.  Interagency Coordination and Compatibility 
 
President Bill Clinton advanced the concept of regulatory co-
herence in 1993 by revoking Executive Order 12291 and replacing 
it with a new Executive Order, 12866, pertaining to “Regulatory 
Planning and Review.”33  A key objective of this Executive Order 
was to “enhance planning and coordination with respect to both 
new and existing regulations” and to “restore the integrity and le-
gitimacy of regulatory review and oversight.”34  This Executive 
                                                   
28  See the discussion infra in Part II.B. 
29  Executive Order No. 12291, 46 Fed.Reg. 13193, 127 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
30  Id., Sec. 2(b). 
31  Id., Sec. 3(c) (requiring agencies to prepare Regulatory Impact Analyses of 
major rule when submitting notices of proposed rulemaking and all final rules to 
the Director). 
32  See e.g. E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under 
Executive Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, 
57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (1994) (discussing the complexities, criticisms, and 
shortcomings of Executive Order 12291). 
33  Executive Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735, 199 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
34  Id., preamble. 
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Order not only strengthens the RIA process required during the 
Reagan era,35 but also emphasizes the importance of interagency 
coordination and compatibility.  The regulatory philosophy and 
principles, as stated in the Executive Order, are to avoid incon-
sistency, incompatibility, or duplication among various regulations 
adopted by federal agencies.36 
With these goals, the OMB performs coordinated reviews of 
agency rulemakings to ensure that regulatory decisions made by 
one agency do not conflict with applicable law or “the policies or 
actions taken or planned by another agency.”37  With the advisory 
assistance of its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA), which serves as a “repository of expertise” on regulatory 
methodologies and interagency coordination procedures, the OMB 
guides federal agencies and assists the President and the Vice Pres-
ident in overall regulatory planning.38  A centralized planning 
mechanism was also established through Executive Order 12866, 
providing for early interagency coordination of regulatory actions, 
facilitating consultation and resolution of potential divergences, 
and achieving a common understanding of priorities.39  While 
amended and supplemented multiple times following its issu-
ance,40 Executive Order 12866 effectively established some of the 
                                                   
35  As the general regulatory philosophy of this Executive Order, “[I]n decid-
ing whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and benefits of 
available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating.” Id., 
Sec. 1(a). In addition, federal agencies are required to “identify and assess availa-
ble alternatives to encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable 
permits, or providing information upon which choices can be made by the pub-
lic.” Id., Sec. 1(b)(3). 
36  Id., Sec. 1(b)(10) (requiring that “[e]ach agency . . . avoid regulations that 
are inconsistent, incompatible, or duplicative with its other regulations or those of 
other Federal agencies.”). 
37  Id., Sec. 2(b). 
38  Id. 
39  Id., Sec. 4 (detailing planning procedures agencies shall adopt in order “to 
have an effective regulatory program.”). 
40  President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13258 in 2002 as well as 
Executive Order 13422 in 2007 to amend 12866.  In 2011, President Barrack Obama 
promulgated Executive Order 13563 that strengthened the program on Regulatory 
Planning and Review and emphasized the importance of public participation.  
The Obama Administration further issued another Executive Order 13610 in 2012 
to expand provisions on public participation, agency priority setting, and regula-
tory accountability;  see generally Steve Charnovitz, US Efforts to Ensure that Regula-
tion Does Not Present Trade Barriers, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development [ICTSD] & World Economic Forum, (2015), 
http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Regulatory-Systems-
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fundamental elements of regulatory coherence necessary for the 
proper functioning of the administrative state. 
 
2.1.5.  Administrative and Judicial Review 
 
Judicial review, together with other mechanisms, is an institu-
tional design implemented to hold governments accountable—
through which a court determines if a statute, an administrative 
regulation, or even a treaty trespasses the limits defined by the 
Constitution or existing law.  Systematic reviews by courts are not 
unique to the United States.  Rather, as a general principle, they are 
perceived and practiced differently in many jurisdictions;  there ex-
ists a massive variation in legal systems as to the rationale, scope, 
and intensity of review, procedural designs, and available reme-
dies.  The United States Constitution does not explicitly create a 
mechanism of judicial review, whose authority is instead inferred 
from the history, structure, and provisions of the Constitution.41  
The APA determines the scope of and the procedures for judicial 
review of federal agency rulemaking, although the courts have 
ruled in support of judicial authority in reviewing administrative 
actions.42  With respect to a final rule promulgated by an agency, 
stakeholders, interest groups, or other members of the public may 
challenge the rule before the court, seeking to strike down the rule 
on a number of grounds, including agency action deemed “arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law.”43  Nevertheless, in reviewing the agency ac-
tion (especially when it concerns an interpretation of a statute), the 
court will in principle defer to the technical expertise of the agency 
                                                                                                                   
Coherence-Charnovitz-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4GU-WDTS] (discussing 
economic growth in the U.S. and the challenges and opportunities experienced 
when reducing regulations for trade liberalization). 
41  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (illustrating judicial review when 
the Court struck down a statute enacted by Congress due to its unconstitutionali-
ty).  
42  See e.g. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding 
that the importance of the right violated implicated the existence of a remedy for 
the administrative violation at issue). 
43  APA, 5 U.S.C. §706 (2) (for other grounds in which the court might find 
agency actions unlawful include: action is “contrary to constitutional rights,” “in 
excess of statutory jurisdiction,” “without observance of procedure required by 
law,” or “unsupported by substantial evidence.”). 
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and strike down the rule if it is contrary to the “unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.”44 
A unique feature of United States practices is the internal ad-
ministrative review of federal agency actions,45 whose mechanism 
is again provided in Executive Order 12866.  More specifically, this 
Executive Order mandates that all agencies must submit to the 
OIRA an institutionalized plan to periodically review existing sig-
nificant regulations.46  Such a review mechanism is designed to de-
termine whether regulations “have become unjustified or unneces-
sary as a result of changed circumstances” and to ensure that they 
remain “compatible with each other and not duplicative or inap-
propriately burdensome in the aggregate.”47  This mechanism al-
lows the agency concerned as well as the OIRA to decide if any 
such rules need to be modified or eliminated to increase effective-
ness or reduce burdens.48  During such a review, the agency is also 
required to identify any congressional mandate that imposes an 
obligation on the agency to promulgate or retain regulations it re-
gards as unnecessary or outdated due to changed circumstances.49  
To ensure the efficacy of the centralized review of both new and 
existing regulations, the OIRA is charged with promoting “greater 
openness, accessibility, and accountability in the regulatory review 
process.”50  Finally, because the abovementioned administrative 
and judicial reviews represent two distinct approaches, nothing in 
Executive Order 12866 affects available judicial review venues.51 
 
                                                   
44  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
45  See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of 
Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1081–82 (1986) (discussing the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of requiring agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analy-
sis of their regulations).  
46  Supra note 33, Sec. 5. 
47  Id. 
48  Id., Sec. 6(b) (defining the OIRA responsibilities when providing guidance 
and oversight to ensure that each agency’s actions are consistent with applicable 
law and not in conflict with another agency’s policies).  
49  Id. 
50  Id., Sec. 6 (b)(2)(C)(4). 
51  Id., Sec. 10 (stating: “This Executive order is intended only to improve the 
internal management of the Federal Government and does not create any right or 
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against 
the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or 
any other person.”). 
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2.1.6.  Regulatory Coherence and Regulatory Cooperation  
 
Taken together, the APA, Executive Orders pertaining to regu-
latory planning and review, and subsequent practices by govern-
mental branches in the United States broadly encompass all of the 
elements of regulatory coherence (although the term has never 
been mentioned),52 which has subsequently been exported to re-
gional and international fora.53  As previously mentioned, these el-
ements of regulatory coherence reflect the American Revolution, 
common law heritage, constitutional design and diffusion of pow-
er, and peculiar characteristics of the legal system (such as the sub-
stantial use of independent agencies)54 in the United States—all de-
signed to limit the range of discretion enjoyed by administrative 
bodies.  As a commentator rightly pointed out, the APA and Exec-
utive Order 12866 have not addressed international cooperation so 
as to cope with different regulatory measures taken by foreign 
economies that create disproportionate burdens or foster unneces-
sary obstacles to trade.55  It was not until President Barack Obama 
issued Executive Order 13609 in 2012 that the United States put 
explicit emphasis on the importance of international regulatory co-
operation in the domestic rulemaking process.56  This Executive 
Order established an interagency working group led by the OIRA 
to address unnecessary regulatory differences between the United 
                                                   
52  See Rodrigo Polanco, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and Regulatory 
Coherence: A Legal Analysis of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, in TRADE 
LIBERALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 231, 246 (Tania Voon ed., 2013) (discuss-
ing the objectives of the TPP in harmonizing national regulations to facilitate 
trade); see Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
Regulatory Reform in the United States: Enhancing Market Openness Through Regulato-
ry Reform, at 11, (1999) http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/2756360.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L5D5-XBBD]. 
53  See discussion on normative diffusion infra in Part II.B.; Cf. Polanco, supra 
note 52, at 231 (“the notion of regulatory coherence has emerged mainly within 
international networks of governance.”). 
54  See Ostry, supra note 18, at 4–5 (discussing how U.S. administrative law 
influenced the formation of GATT through its historical formation and its unique 
structural characteristics of independent regulatory agencies). 
55  Charnovitz, supra note 40. 
56  Executive Order No. 13609, 77 FR 26413 (May 1, 2012); see Polanco, supra 
note 52, at 246 (referencing Executive Order No. 12866, issued under the Clinton 
Administration, to demonstrate United States government’s interest in regulatory 
coherence). 
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States and its major trading partners across borders.57  
It should be emphasized that the concept of regulatory coher-
ence has (at least to date) largely focused on the domestic adminis-
trative context and processes and must be distinguished from the 
idea of regulatory cooperation.  When employed at the interna-
tional level, however, the term regulatory coherence is frequently 
referred to in regional and multilateral trade discussions, and yet 
there is no practical or scholarly consensus regarding its defini-
tion.58  Some scholars approach regulatory coherence in an expan-
sive manner, mingling elements of transparency and public consul-
tation, regulatory impact analysis, harmonization of regulatory 
standards, and mutual recognition,59 and this is plausibly due to 
the fact that in practice, recent preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs) and megaregional agreements have not provided strict or-
ganizational separation in terms of treaty design.  Others draw a 
                                                   
57  See generally Reeve T. Bull et al., New Approaches to International Regulatory 
Cooperation: The Challenge of TTIP, TPP, and Mega-Regional Trade Agreements, 78 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1–29 (2015)(discussing how new global trends and the 
rise of multi-lateral partnerships might pose challenges to domestic regulatory 
frameworks); Cf. Cass Sunstein, Reducing Ted Tape: Regulatory Reform Goes Interna-
tional, Blog on Obama White House Archives (May 1, 2012, 11:09 AM), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/05/01/reducing-red-tape-
regulatory-reform-goes-international [https://perma.cc/KC77-WZMR] (discuss-
ing how President Obama’s new Executive Order 13563 “Improving Regulation 
and Regulatory Review” promotes International Regulatory Cooperation, and in 
turn, will help American exports, economic growth, and job creation). 
58  See Theodore Posner & David Wolff, Making “Regulatory Coherence” Coher-
ent, Law360 (April 25, 2011) at 3 (“One reason for a bit of skepticism is that the 
concept of “regulatory coherence” means different things to different people. 
There is no one, commonly accepted understanding of the concept.”). Polanco cit-
ed Posner and Wolff and further noted that the introduction of regulatory coher-
ence into international treaty-making poses a number of questions without clear 
answers, the most essential being its very definition. “Until we have a more fo-
cused understanding of what we mean by regulatory coherence, it will be difficult 
to study and measure it as a distinct political phenomenon.” Polanco, supra note 
52, at 231.  
59  See e.g. Polanco, supra note 52, at 231;  Sheargold & Mitchell, supra note 9, 
at 5–8. Sheargold & Mitchell take the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
ship (TTIP) as an example, stating that regulatory coherence is included in the 
general idea of “regulatory issues and non-tariff barriers to trade,” which embrac-
es a broad range of elements for international cooperation.  Therefore, according 
to their interpretation, regulatory coherence may “involve several different as-
pects: transparency, the efficiency and quality of regulation, and harmonization of 
regulatory standards across jurisdiction.”  Polanco also noted that, regulatory co-
herence means substantive regulatory harmonization for some, a harmonization 
process for the development and adoption of regulations for others, and mutual 
recognition of regulations for still others.  
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clear line between the two terms, arguing that regulatory coher-
ence refers to good regulatory practices and provisions alike, while 
regulatory cooperation denotes measures aimed at reducing diver-
gence among jurisdictions through methodologies such as mutual 
recognition, harmonization, or even joint rulemaking.60 
We are of the view that the two concepts indeed have different 
focuses and rationales.  Regulatory coherence, as analyzed above, 
is embedded in democratic accountability and the rule of law, and 
is particularly aimed at the reform and discipline of domestic regu-
latory processes.  Regulatory cooperation, on the other hand, is the 
process of interaction or partnership between regulators from dif-
ferent governments intended to reduce divergences and increase 
interoperability across borders.61  Governments undertake a myri-
ad of regulatory cooperative mechanisms today, ranging from soft 
law and private codes, transgovernmental dialogue and networks, 
mutual recognition and harmonization, to regional and interna-
                                                   
60  See e.g. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Regulatory Spillovers 
and the Trading System: From Coherence to Cooperation, THE E15 INITIATIVE 
STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL TRADE SYSTEM, at 2–3, (April 2015) 
http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/E15-Regulatory-OP-
Hoekman-and-Mavroidis-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ETZ7-9K3S] (discussing 
domestic regulation, trade, and international spillovers);  see also Marjorie Chor-
lins Vice Presisent For Eur. Aff. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Address at the Regu-
latory Coherence and Cooperation in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (July, 15 2015) (discussing the U.S. government’s support for regula-
tory coherence and cooperation during the TTIP negotiations); Jonathan B. Wiener 
& Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP as a 
Learning Process Toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78(4) LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
103 (2015) (discussing the challenges and benefits of international regulatory co-
operation).  It should be noted that some also see regulatory coherence as flipsides 
of regulatory divergence, which may also be addressed by way of regulatory co-
operation;  see Simon Lester & Inu Manak, Addressing Regulatory Trade Barriers in 
Mega-Regional Trade Agreements, in MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 337 (Thilo 
Rensmann ed., 2017) (addressing how regulatory trade barriers are prompting 
states to discuss international regulatory cooperation). 
61  See Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 60, at 105 (“international regulatory 
cooperation denotes a series of steps to coordinate regulation across countries.”);  
see also Alberto Alemanno, Is There a Role for Cost-Benefit Analysis Beyond the Na-
tion-State? Lessons from International Regulatory Cooperation, in THE GLOBALIZATION 
OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 104, 105 (Richard Revesz & 
Michael Livermore eds., 2013) (stating that regulatory cooperation often emerges 
from the interplay of regulatory reform efforts at the national level and trade lib-
eralization efforts across borders);  see also Simon Lester & Inu Barbee, The Chal-
lenge of Cooperation: Regulatory Trade Barriers in the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 847, 856–57 (2013) (discussing attempts to 
promote international regulatory cooperation to reduce “unnecessary differences 
in regulatory requirements.”).  
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tional agreements, regulatory partnerships between governments, 
and joint regulatory institutions.62  Nonetheless, while the defini-
tions of regulatory coherence and regulatory cooperation can be 
conceptually separated, the two concepts are by no means practi-
cally insulated and mutually exclusive.63  On the contrary, they in-
teract at many levels and are often mutually reinforcing.  For in-
stance, regulatory cooperation among governments is an effective 
means of mutual learning and of disseminating of good regulatory 
practices.64  Likewise, the RIA of a domestic regulation with poten-
tial extraterritorial effects may include an assessment of impact on 
international trade and burdens on foreign suppliers.  Rigorous 
regulatory coherence by a government usually translates to trans-
parent, participatory, and accountable rulemaking processes, 
which in turn directly benefit, or indirectly serve as fitting infra-
structure for, international regulatory cooperation. 
 
                                                   
62  See OECD, INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION: RULES FOR A GLOBAL 
WORLD 8–10 (Oct 14, 2012) (categorizing eleven types of mechanisms for interna-
tional regulatory cooperation);  see also Bull et al., supra note 57, at 8–12 (outlining 
structures of and techniques for international regulatory cooperation);  see also 
OECD, INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION: ADDRESSING GLOBAL 
CHALLENGES 19–74 (2013)(“[S]ynthesiz[ing] the knowledge and evidence . . . on 
the various mechanisms used by governments to promote regulatory co-
operation.”);  OECD, REGULATORY COOPERATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 
17 (1994)(“There is no overall and cross-country consensus yet . . . on the range 
and definition of the different mechanisms . . . to promote IRC.”).   
63  A boundary case (or an example of practical overlap) may be the transpar-
ency requirements under various WTO-covered agreements. The content of the 
requirement includes notification and consultation (which is in essence a design 
of regulatory coherence), but the objective rests in promoting inter-governmental 
regulatory cooperation (as the requirements target the importing Member-
exporting Member relationship);  see infra the discussion below in this Part on the 
WTO transparency requirements. 
64  Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Decisions and Recommendations 
Adopted by the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade Since 1 January 1995, 
WTO Doc. G/TBT/1/Rev.13 (Mar. 8, 2017), at 9;  Committee on Technical Barriers 
to Trade, Fifth Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Argument 
on Technical Barriers to Trade Under Article 15.4, WTO Doc. G/TBT/26 (Nov. 13, 
2009), paras. 14–15;  see also Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 60, at 126 (“Variation 
in regulatory approaches can offer an opportunity for learning about policy im-
pacts from differing approaches and, thus, how to improve regulation in the fu-
ture.”). 
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2.2.  Normative Diffusion:  The Emergence of Regulatory Coherence as 
a Governance/Trade Objective at Regional and International 
Levels 
 
The United States was primarily responsible for the post-war 
architecture of international economic order, which reflected the 
American values and governance models of that period.65  As the 
following analysis indicates, there has been a notable normative 
diffusion, from which regulatory coherence, originally an Ameri-
can concept, has emerged as a trade governance objective at both 
regional and multilateral levels.  
The APA was enacted during negotiations over the new trad-
ing system, when the United States State Department presented the 
Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization of the 
United Nations to elaborate on its Proposals for Expansion of 
World Trade and Employment in September 1946.66  Article 15 of 
the proposed charter was entitled “Publication and Administration 
of Trade Regulations—Advanced Notice of Restrictive Regula-
tions,”67 which was subsequently incorporated into the Havana 
Charter for the ITO as Article 38 and, without significant revision, 
as Article X of the GATT.68  As observed by Ostry, Article X of the 
GATT “replicates most of the American approach” to transparency 
and public consultation, and the incorporation of such a norm was 
not controversial, as “[b]order barriers such as tariffs and quotas 
are, for the most part, quite transparent.”69  However, Article X of 
the GATT fell short of an effective mechanism to address the chal-
lenges brought about by the new “protectionism”—that is, the shift 
of protectionist trade policy from tariffs and quotas to “behind-the-
border” regulatory barriers to trade.70  
                                                   
65  Ostry, supra note 18, at 2. 
66  US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1946). 
67  Id. 
68  See Ostry, supra note 18, at 5–6 (noting that although the title of Article X of 
the GATT, “Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations,” does not in-
clude the words “advanced notice of restrictive regulations,” the language of the 
Article does not vary considerably from the original US proposal in 1946). 
69  Id. at 6–8.  Article X of the GATT may be also regarded as an administra-
tive law provision.  See Richard B. Stewart et al., The World Trade Organization: 
Multiple Dimensions of Global Administrative Law, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 556, 570 (2011) 
(arguing that Article X was key to “the emergence of global administrative law.”). 
70  As noted earlier, the traditional barriers to trade (tariffs and quotas) have 
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The Uruguay Round, launched in 1986, pushed along some el-
ements of regulatory coherence, which were then incorporated by 
the WTO.  The vastly expanded transparency requirements in the 
covered agreements—which ask WTO members to publish and 
give proper notice regarding laws, regulations, and modes of ad-
ministration—serve as a suitable illustration.  Articles X:1 and X:2 
of the GATT include transparency requirements, while other 
agreements also incorporate similar obligations to publish covered 
measures in a timely manner.71  Other notable examples of incor-
porating regulatory coherence elements include identifying regula-
tory objectives (Article XX of the GATT,72 Article XIV of the 
GATS,73 Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement,74 and Annex A of the 
                                                                                                                   
declined and non-tariff measures (such as domestic standards and regulations) 
have increased as determinants of market access.  Domestic regulations are of cru-
cial importance to ensure the environment, public health and safety, and competi-
tion, but may unnecessarily impede international trade (especially those without 
adequate prior notification or, in some cases, scientific justification).  Due to the 
gradual shift of protectionism from tariffs to rulemaking (i.e., non-tariff barriers to 
trade), subsequent GATT negotiations were not adequately equipped to cope with 
non-transparent non-tariff measures.  Finally, the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds 
brought some improvement to the system, including an emphasis on advance no-
tice and opportunity to inquire and/or comment;  Ostry, supra note 18, at 11;  
Thomas J. Bollyky, Regulatory Coherence in the TPP Talks, in THE TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENT 171, 172 
(Chin L. Lim et al. eds., 2012). 
71  See Andrew D. Mitchell et al., Good Governance Obligations in International 
Economic Law: A Comparative Analysis of Trade and Investment, 17 J. WORLD INV. & 
TRADE 7, 25 (2016) (charting the good governance requirements for various provi-
sions). 
72  GATT, art. XX specifies certain policy objectives that a WTO Member may 
resort to as an exception to other GATT obligations.  It reads “Subject to the re-
quirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would consti-
tute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, noth-
ing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement 
by any contracting party of measures:  (a) necessary to protect public morals;  (b) 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; . . . (g) relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective 
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption . . . .” 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].  For a thorough discussion, see Donald H. Regan, 
The Meaning of “Necessary” in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of 
Cost-Benefit Balancing, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 347 (2007). 
73  Similarly, Article XIV of the GATS lists specific policy goals for WTO 
Members to invoke as an exception.  “Subject to the requirement that such 
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions pre-
vail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement 
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SPS Agreement75) and evaluating the necessity of regulation, con-
sidering reasonably available alternatives, and financial and tech-
nological capabilities (Article XX of the GATT,76 Article 2.2 of the 
TBT Agreement,77 and Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement78).79  
The WTO has increasingly recognized that the effective imple-
mentation of regulatory coherence can be an important means of 
reducing unnecessary barriers to trade, and the Committee on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee) has demonstrated the 
most momentum.80  In 2006, WTO Members formally incorporated 
good regulatory practices in the agenda of the TBT Committee,81 
                                                                                                                   
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of 
measures:  (a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order;  (b) 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health . . . .” General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services, art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter 
GATS];  see Regan, supra note 72. 
74  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art 2.1, Apr. 15 1994, 1868 
U.N.T.S 12 (1994) [hereinafter TBT Agreement] ( “Members shall ensure that in 
respect of technical regulations, products imported from the territory of any 
Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin and to like products originating in any other coun-
try.”).  
75  See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, Annex A, Apr. 15 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (1994) [hereinafter SPS 
Agreement] (providing four specific objectives that render a governmental meas-
ure an SPS measure). 
76  GATT, art. XX;  see also Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting 
Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007), 
paras. 145–147 (discussing the evaluation of the effectiveness of a particular regu-
lation.). 
77  See TBT Agreement, art. 2.2 (“Members shall ensure that technical regula-
tions are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of cre-
ating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.  For this purpose, technical 
regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate 
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create.”). 
78  See SPS Agreement, art. 5.6 (“[W]hen establishing or maintaining sanitary 
or phytosanitary measures to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or phyto-
sanitary protection, Members shall ensure that such measures are not more trade-
restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosan-
itary protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility.”). 
79  For a more thorough explanation, see e.g. Sheargold & Mitchell, supra note 
9, at 603–09 (discussing the purposes of, alternatives to, and justifications for regu-
lation). 
80  See generally Thomas J. Bollyky, A Role for the World Trade Organization on 
Regulatory Coherence, E15Initiative, at 1(ICTSD & World Economic Forum, Aug. 
2015). 
81  Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Summary Report of the WTO TBT 
Workshop on Good Regulatory Practice, WTO Doc. G/TBT/W/287 (June 6, 2008), 1–
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which further encouraged Members to exchange information re-
garding their implementation experiences.82  Most of these ex-
changes took place in the Committee’s thematic sessions on good 
regulatory practices in March 2013, June 2013, and March 2014.83  
The Sixth Triennial Review of the TBT Committee stressed the im-
portance of international regulatory coordination and agreed to 
identify a non-exhaustive list of voluntary mechanisms and princi-
ples of good regulatory practice.84  The most recent Triennial Re-
view in 2015 further discussed regional initiatives pertaining to 
good regulatory practices and specifically referred to the 2005 
APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist on Regulatory Reform (see the 
discussion below), which encourages APEC members to adopt a 
holistic approach to the development of regulations.85  On balance, 
the TBT Committee has recognized that: 
Good Regulatory Practices (GRP) can contribute to the im-
proved and effective implementation of the substantive ob-
ligations under the TBT Agreement.  Effective implementa-
tion through best practices is seen as an important means of 
avoiding unnecessary obstacles to trade.  Institutionalizing 
the various mechanisms, processes, and procedures of GRP 
through laws, regulations, and guidance, as well as through 
the creation and designation of institutions within Member 
governments to oversee regulatory processes, is seen as a 
                                                                                                                   
28;  see Bollyky, supra note 70, at 178–79 (discussing the benefits of “an integrated 
approach to regulatory coherence.”). 
82  See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Fifth Triennial Review of the 
Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade under 
Article 15.4, WTO Doc. G/TBT/26 (Nov. 19, 2009), 5–6 (discussing recommenda-
tions to facilitate trade through the exchange of information). 
83  Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Thematic Session on Good Regula-
tory Practice, WTO Doc. G/TBT/GEN/143 (Mar. 11, 2013);  Committee on Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade, Second Thematic Session on Good Regulatory Practice, WTO 
Doc. G/TBT/GEN/143/Add.1 (June 25, 2013);  Committee on Technical Barriers 
to Trade, Third Thematic Session on Good Regulatory Practice, WTO Doc. 
G/TBT/GEN/143/Add.2 (Mar. 18–19, 2014). 
84  Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Sixth Triennial Review of the Op-
eration and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade under Arti-
cle 15.4, WTO Doc. G/TBT/32 (Nov. 29, 2012), para. 4.  The triennial reviews are 
carried out in accordance with the mandate under Article 15.4 of the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade. 
85  Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Seventh Triennial Review of the 
Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade under 
Article 15.4, WTO Doc. G/TBT/37 (Dec. 3, 2015), at 3–4. 
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means of giving effect to GRP.  Effective internal policy co-
ordination, including among regulators, standardizing bod-
ies and trade officials implementing the TBT Agreement, is 
stressed.  Additionally, regulatory cooperation between 
Members is an effective means of disseminating GRP.86 
Beyond the WTO, there has also been growing recognition and 
use of regulatory coherence in many other countries, as well as in 
some PTAs.87  Indeed, the deregulation and regulatory relief mind-
set in the aforesaid aspects of United States administrative law 
have “evolved over time into a broader agenda of regulatory re-
form and good regulatory practices” that strive to promote trans-
parency, cost-effectiveness, quality, and efficiency in regulatory ac-
tions.88  Such an agenda of regulatory coherence has subsequently 
been embraced in many other developed countries, such as Aus-
tralia and New Zealand.89  The internationalization of regulatory 
impact analysis has been further observed by many commentators 
                                                   
86  Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Decisions and Recommendations 
Adopted by the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade Since 1 of January 1995: 
Note by the Secretariat, WTO Doc. G/TBT/1/Rev.13 (Mar. 8, 2017), 6;  see also 
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Fifth Triennial Review of the Operation 
and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade under Article 15.4, 
WTO Doc. G/TBT/26 (Nov. 13, 2009), paras. 8–9 and 14 (discussing the value of 
good regulatory practices). 
87  See Bollyky, supra note 70, at 177–78 (noting that this phenomenon was 
aligned with the context of the regulatory reform movement which can be traced 
back to the deregulation and regulatory relief initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s);  
see also Council of the OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Poli-
cy and Governance (March 22, 2012), at 8 (discussing OECD’s recommendations 
for the implementation, evaluation, and purpose of regulations). 
88  Bollyky, supra note 70, at 177–78;  see also Scott Jacobs & Peter Ladegaard, 
Regulatory Governance in Developing Countries, Washington, D.C. (International 
Finance Corporation, 2010), at vii (discussing the promotion of “a regulatory sys-
tem that is effective, efficient, transparent, and accessible.”). 
89  See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regu-
latory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1260–39 (2007) (discussing Reagan-era cen-
tralized review of regulations);  see also Rosalyn Bell, Regulatory Impact Analysis: 
Australia’s Experience, Presentation delivered at the OECD Regulatory Reform 
Workshop, Stockholm (June 3–4, 2013), at 
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Breakout-session-2-
Rosalyn%20Bell-RIA-Australia's-experience.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTY2-HGBV] 
(last visited May 30, 2017) (discussing the results of a study conducted by the Aus-
tralian Productivity Commission); NEW ZEALAND PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, 
REPORT ON REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES, 
http://www.productivity.govt.nz/sites/default/files/regulatory-institutions-
and-practices-final-resort.pef [https://perma.cc/MA49-PPBR] (discussing regula-
tory reform in New Zealand). 
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around the world, covering the adoption of RIA, ongoing discus-
sions, and varied practices in countries and regions such as the 
United Kingdom, Sri Lanka, Mexico, East Africa, and Southeast 
Europe.90  In addition, while existing PTAs do not usually include 
a chapter devoted to regulatory coherence, provisions related to 
some elements of the concept (such as strengthened transparency 
requirements) are well represented to ensure that trading partners 
are informed of developments in relevant regulations and stand-
ards.91  Examples of a generally applicable notice-and-comment re-
quirement, as well as a review mechanism, can also be found in 
PTAs such as, inter alia, the Korea–United States Free Trade 
Agreement (Chapter 21),92 the Peru–Singapore Free Trade Agree-
ment (Chapter 15),93 and the New Zealand–China Free Trade 
Agreement (Chapter 13).94  Furthermore, some commentators have 
observed the growing practice of including transparency obliga-
tions in investment agreements, including the US Model BIT 
(2012).95 
Remarkably, both the concept of regulatory coherence and the 
regulatory reform agenda have been embraced by numerous inter-
national and intergovernmental organizations, including the 
APEC, OECD, and World Bank, as promoting the rule of law, trade 
and development, and as a more effective and efficient approach to 
public policy objectives.96  Among these intergovernmental efforts, 
                                                   
90  See REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT TOWARDS BETTER REGULATION? 10–15 
(Colin Kirkpatrick & David Parker eds., 2007) (discussing the use of RIA in devel-
oped and developing countries).  
91  See Sheargold & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 594 (discussing transparency and 
mutual recognition provisions in PTAs). 
92  Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor–U.S., June 30, 2007. 
93  Free Trade Agreement, Peru–Sing., May 29, 2008. 
94  Free Trade Agreement, N.Z.–China, Apr. 7, 2008. 
95  Sheargold & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 593. 
96  See relevant discussion in Bollyky, supra note 70, at 172–73;  see also OECD, 
Regulatory Policy and Governance 41–57 (“Regulatory policy has already made a 
significant contribution to economic development and societal well-being.”);  
World Bank, Doing Business 2012: Doing Business in a More Transparent World, 
(International Finance Corporation/World Bank Group), at 16–25 (discussing the 
effects of regulations and regulatory reform on social and economic outcomes);  
World Bank, Simplification of Business Regulation at the Subnational Level: A Re-
form Implementation Toolkit for Project Teams (International Finance Corpora-
tion/World Bank Group) v-1, at 4–7 (2006) (describing the benefits of regulatory 
simplification);  see also OECD, Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries: From In-
terventionism to Regulatory Governance 28 (2002) (reporting recent economic 
success of certain countries as a result of “the adoption of coherent and effective 
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one prominent and comprehensive instrument is the 2005 APEC-
OECD Integrated Checklist on Regulatory Reform (APEC-OECD 
Checklist), designed as a voluntary tool for governments to utilize 
“to evaluate their respective regulatory reform efforts.”97  Argua-
bly, previous efforts to promote regulatory coherence converged in 
the APEC/OECD,98 which further advanced the discourse—and 
negotiations, such as those in TPP—at various levels.  
The APEC-OECD Checklist is the product of the cooperative 
initiative on regulatory reform undertaken by the APEC and the 
OECD and launched during the 2000 Ministerial Conference in 
Brunei Darussalam, with the objectives of advancing regulatory 
quality, efficiency, transparency, accountability, economic growth, 
and market openness.99  Based on the pooled experience and 
knowledge of the APEC and the OECD, the Checklist underscores 
key issues to be considered throughout the entire regulatory pro-
cess, from development to implementation, while “recognizing 
that the diversity of economic, social, and political environments 
and values of member economies require flexibility in the meth-
ods.”100  With regard to the horizontal criteria for regulatory re-
                                                                                                                   
regulatory policy.”). 
97  APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist on Regulatory Reform 1 (2005).  Some 
commentators regard APEC and the OECD as the key drivers for the promotion 
of regulatory coherence, which “has emerged mainly within international net-
works of governance.”  Polanco, supra note 52, at 231.  Others also note that the 
OECD and the APEC have been promoting regulatory reform for decades, and 
some of their efforts have included approaches to improving domestic regulatory 
processes that can facilitate international trade and investment.  Sheargold & 
Mitchell, supra note 9, at 590. 
98  APEC has focused on the promotion of high-quality regulatory environ-
ment, transparency, efficiency, and unnecessary burdens to promote economic 
development and trade in the Asia-Pacific region since its establishment.  In 1994, 
APEC created a Sub-Committee on Standards and Conformance to promote the 
elimination of trade distortions arising from inefficiency, unnecessary, or conflict-
ing regulations and standards among member economies.  Bollyky, supra note 70, 
at 181.  OECD countries were the earliest movers to take actions to improve their 
regulatory systems, as over half of the OECD countries had by 1996 adopted RIA, 
which was further noted in 2009 as one of the most widely used processes for im-
proving the quality of rulemaking processes.  Polanco, supra note 52, at 234–35;  
Scott H. Jacobs, An Overview of Regulatory Impact Analysis in OECD Countries, in 
REGULATORY IMPACT STUDIES: BEST PRACTICES IN OECD COUNTRIES 13 (OECD ed., 
1997);  OECD, Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Tool for Policy Coherence 13 
(OECD, 2009). 
99  The APEC-OECD Checklist comprises of four pillars: regulatory reform, 
regulatory policies, competition policy, and market liberalization policies. APEC-
OECD Checklist, at 1–36. 
100  APEC-OECD Checklist, preamble. 
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form, the Checklist highlights the use of RIA in the regulatory pro-
cess, as well as the need for an integrated system that supports and 
coordinates all sectors of the government.101  Effective inter-
ministerial systems for managing and coordinating regulatory ef-
forts, preferably a central body or an institutionalized mechanism, 
are strongly recommended.102  However, the APEC-OECD Check-
list acknowledges the following: 
It is often difficult for regulators to reform themselves.  
Special interests, close identification with the objectives of 
outdated regulation, and countervailing pressures from dif-
ferent parts of society make such self-reform even more 
complex.  In addition, modern regulations and regimes ap-
ply across multiple areas.  Regulatory quality control and 
consistency may benefit when responsibility is shared be-
tween regulators and a central quality control entity.103 
Therefore, it is critical that governments have clearly defined 
regulatory coherence principles that guide them in formulating 
good regulatory practices.  Toward this end, the Checklist also em-
phasizes transparency and public consultation, as well as the bene-
fits to stakeholders as well as regulators, as reflected in the afore-
mentioned United States administrative law.  According to the 
instrument, “appropriate and well-publicised procedures for effec-
tive and timely inputs from interested national and foreign parties” 
advance the quality of rulemaking and reduce compliance costs for 
stakeholders.104  According to Bollyky, since the APEC and the 
OECD embrace the concepts of transparency and public consulta-
tion, and expand the scope of participation to cover all interested 
persons across borders and bureaucratic levels, they remain among 
the most difficult points of regulatory coherence to understand and 
implement.105  Finally, the APEC-OECD Checklist emphasizes the 
rule of law and its international dimension, stating “[it] means that 
all properly functioning regulatory systems and every regulatory 
action  . . .  must be based in law,” and suggests that member gov-
ernments evaluate the conformity of their proposed regulations 
                                                   
101  APEC-OECD Checklist, at 9. 
102  APEC-OECD Checklist, at 9 and 15;  see also Bollyky, supra note 70, at 237.  
103  APEC-OECD Checklist, at 15. 
104  APEC-OECD Checklist, at 17. 
105  Bollyky, supra note 70, at 238.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
 
160 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 40:1 
 
with international commitments, especially relevant WTO obliga-
tions.106  This approach strongly echoes our argument that the two 
concepts, regulatory coherence and regulatory cooperation, are of-
ten interactive and mutually reinforcing.107  
The 2011 APEC Leaders’ Declaration dedicated a section and 
an annex to regulatory convergence and cooperation, with the aim 
of eliminating unjustifiably burdensome and outdated regulations, 
increasing productivity and jobs, and protecting the environment, 
public health, safety, and security.108  Annex D required member 
economies to take specific steps to implement good regulatory 
practices: to ensure internal coordination of regulatory work 
among trade, standards, and regulatory agencies by an institution-
alized method; to incorporate the element of RIA in the regulatory 
process (specifically, the evaluation of less restrictive alternatives); 
and to adopt transparency and public consultation procedures 
pursuant to the APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist.109  Notably, the 
Declaration also touched upon some aspects of regulatory coopera-
tion, emphasizing that “greater alignment in regulatory approach-
es, including to international standards, is necessary to prevent 
needless barriers to trade from stifling economic growth and em-
ployment.”110  
Efforts in the APEC-OECD forum have propelled the inclusion 
of a full chapter devoted to regulatory coherence in TPP, which 
represents a major development in this global normative diffu-
sion.111  The TPP is the first megaregional agreement to incorporate 
                                                   
106  See APEC-OECD Checklist, at 15 (“[e]very well functioning rule-making 
process will have a procedure for examining the proposed regulatory action for 
legality and compliance with other requirements, such as adherence to WTO obli-
gations.”). 
107  In the previous section we offer an example, where the RIA of a domestic 
regulation with potential extraterritorial effects may include the assessment of 
impact on international trade and burdens on foreign suppliers;  see supra Part 
II.A. 
108  2011 APEC Leaders’ Declaration, Honolulu, Hawaii, United States (Nov 
12–13, 2011). 
109  2011 APEC Leaders’ Declaration, Annex D, Strengthening Implementa-
tion of Good Regulatory Practices, Honolulu, Hawaii, United States (Nov 12–13, 
2011). 
110  2011 APEC Leaders’ Declaration. 
111  TPP, Chapter 25. The Chapter is highlighted as an achievement of PTA 
negotiation to eliminate unnecessary regulatory barriers and to make the regula-
tory systems of TPP parties more compatible and transparent.  For a concise dis-
cussion, see Ian Fergusson & Bruce Vaughn, The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (CRS Report for Congress No. R40502, Congressional Research Ser-
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all of the elements of regulatory coherence, primarily due to the 
fact that all of the TPP Parties are also APEC members and have 
previously agreed upon the relevance and importance of improv-
ing regulatory processes at the global level.112  The TPP Chapter on 
Regulatory Coherence requires Parties to implement good regula-
tory practices in their rulemaking processes for a more effective 
and efficient achievement of their policy objectives, as well as the 
facilitation of international trade, investment, economic growth, 
and employment.113  While the Chapter leaves the scope of applica-
tion up to the Parties to determine, they are expected to achieve 
“significant coverage” of regulatory measures.114  The Regulatory 
Coherence Chapter explicitly refers to good regulatory practices 
intended to discipline government actions throughout the rule-
making process.  Good regulatory practices apply to the planning, 
design, issuance, implementation, and review of covered regulato-
ry measures, where Parties must enhance stakeholder engagement, 
respond to comments, and explain regulatory rationale, and re-
view and revise regulatory measures.115  The regulatory coherence 
rules in TPP include, more specifically, notice and comment proce-
dures, stakeholder participation, duty to explain, access to infor-
mation, and mutual consultation.  With enhanced stakeholder in-
volvement (comment, response, and consultation) and Parties’ 
commitment to conduct ex-post assessments, potential causes of 
trade disputes may be identified and addressed at earlier stages, 
which in turn reduces the likelihood of unpleasant surprises and 
trade conflicts after a measure is adopted and implemented.  The 
increased transparency and predictability in the rulemaking pro-
cess may also help Parties prevent unnecessary disputes, resolve 
                                                                                                                   
vice, Dec 12, 2011), at 8. 
112  See Thomas J. Bollyky, Better Regulation for Freer Trade (Policy Innova-
tion Memorandum No. 22), at 2–3. 
113  TPP, Article 25.2. 
114  TPP, Article 25.3. 
115  TPP, Articles 25.5.6, 25.5.7, and 25.8.  For a discussion on the implications 
of the TPP Regulatory Coherence Chapter, see Sheargold & Mitchell, supra note 9, 
at 597–600 (“While these provisions may provide a framework for future integra-
tion and the reduction of regulatory divergence among TPP parties, in their cur-
rent form they are very general provisions, which provide little specificity or con-
crete vision for what that future cooperation might entail.”).  Yet Sheargold and 
Mitchell suggest that the novelty and significance lie in the TPP’s reference to 
good regulatory practices in the treaty language in relation to the regulatory au-
tonomy of governments.  Id. 
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frictions within a definite timeframe, and avoid lengthy and costly 
dispute settlement.  Notably, a Party to TPP “shall endeavour to 
ensure that it has processes or mechanisms to facilitate the effective 
interagency coordination and review of proposed covered regula-
tory measures,” preferably by establishing a central coordinating 
body.116  While the detailed institutional arrangements are left to 
each TPP Party, it seems clear that such a provision was introduced 
by the United States with the model of the OIRA in mind.117 
The above is an endeavor to trace the contours of the emer-
gence of global regulatory coherence, from administrative law in 
the United States to other jurisdictions, international organizations 
(such as the WTO, APEC, and OECD), and trade agreements.  The 
most recent evidence—the above-named TPP chapter—
significantly transforms the relatively voluntary nature of regulato-
ry coherence at the international level (as APEC-OECD best prac-
tices) to a potentially enforceable treaty obligation to actively 
launch processes and create mechanisms (whatever room for dis-
cretion is left to the Parties to determine their preferred methodol-
ogy or institutional design).118  Intriguingly, as a key player in the 
domain of international trade, China has arguably remained rather 
silent and indifferent in the entire course of development.119  Such 
a state of play surely merits further analysis of the unique Chinese 
context, as well as its interaction with the recent initiative on regu-
latory coherence, to which we now turn.  
 
3.  CHINA’S EVOLVING REGULATORY REGIME IN A GLOBALIZED 
WORLD 
3.1.  Legal and Institutional Reform:  Early Efforts in the Pre- and 
Post-WTO Era 
 
                                                   
116  TPP, art. 25.4.1. 
117  Sheargold & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 598; Bollyky, supra note 70, at 181;  
Fergusson & Vaughn, supra note 111, at 37. 
118  TPP, arts. 25.3, 25.4.2, 25.5, 25.7.1, and 25.11;  see also Jane Kelsey, Prelimi-
nary Analysis of the Draft TPP Chapter on Domestic Coherence 5 (Citizens Trade 
Campaign, Oct 23, 2011) (discussing obligations under TPP proposal). 
119  As the time of writing, we are not aware of any active step taken by China 
to embrace or promote the elements of regulatory coherence at both domestic and 
international levels. 
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Any meaningful discussion of China’s regulatory-based trade 
barriers, corresponding reforms, and approaches to regulatory co-
herence will inevitably touch upon limits on government activities.  
Such limits are often embedded in the Chinese administrative law 
regime and are closely intertwined with the notion of the “rule of 
law.”  The notion of rule of law has been highly contested in con-
temporary China.120  Although the founding fathers of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) seemed to embrace this idea by requiring 
civil servants to act according to law and serve the people’s inter-
ests, since the nation’s first constitution in 1954,121 the Cultural 
Revolution and other episodes in Maoist China revealed the ruling 
elites’ preference for “governance through mass movements, cam-
paigns, and charismatic appeals,” rejecting “governance through 
law.”122  For Mao, the concept of law and a legal system may have 
run counter to the revolution;  what China needed was not “the 
                                                   
120   It is argued that long before the PRC was established, the notion of rule 
of law and administrative laws have been part of China’s legal system, though 
their purpose was to ensure that government officials faithfully carried out the 
Emperors’ orders;  see THE GREAT QING CODE 1–11 (William C. Jones trans., 1994) 
(highlighting the history and development of rule and law practices in China);  
Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Adminis-
trative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China, 19 Berkeley J. 
Int’l. L. 161, 186 (2001) [hereinafter Peerenboom, Administrative Law Reform and 
Rule of Law in the PRC] (discussing ongoing shifts in China’s administrative legal 
regime and the extent to which it has been influenced by globalization).  For a re-
count of rule of law in China after 1949, see Hungdah Chiu, The 1982 Chinese Con-
stitution and the Rule of Law, in Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in CONTEMP. 
ASIAN STUD., 6–8 (No. 4–1985);  Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L. L. 43 (2001);  Jerome Alan Cohen, Tiananmen and the Rule of Law, in 
THE BROKEN MIRROR: CHINA AFTER TIANANMEN 323 (George Hicks ed, 1990);  Pak 
K. Chew, The Rule of Law: China’s Skepticism and the Rule of People, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 43 (2005). 
121  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa [Const.] art. 18 (1954) (“All 
servants of the state must be loyal to the people’s democratic system, observe the 
Constitution and the law and strive to serve the people.”).  The 1954 Constitution 
was later superseded by those promulgated in 1975, 1978, and 1982, respectively.  
The 1982 Constitution is the current constitution, which has been amended in 
1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004. 
122  See John Ohnesorge, Chinese Administrative Law in the Northeast Asian Mir-
ror, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 103 136–37 (2006) (highlighting the evolu-
tion of China’s integration of administrative law and its role in private life).  Dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution, for instance, “the few open law schools were closed 
and the law faculty sent to labor camps,” while “law libraries and books were de-
stroyed by the Red Guard.”  The legal profession, as James M. Zimmermann re-
marks, “disappeared overnight, and almost no laws were enacted and no law 
books published” at the time.  JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A 
LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES 53 (4th ed., 2014). 
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rule of law,” but “the rule of individuals.”123  Moreover, the rule of 
law is often seen as having its root in liberal Western democracies, 
which contradicts the ideology shaped by the Chinese Communist 
Party.124 
Nevertheless, the late 1970s witnessed a sea change.  In the 
post-Mao era, for Deng Xiao Ping and other leaders, the legitimacy 
of single-party socialism was largely dependent upon the nation’s 
survival and prosperity, which in turn hinged on sustainable eco-
nomic development.125  These objectives were not going to be 
achieved with Mao’s rule of man, but with a modernized legal sys-
tem that would help China “gain the confidence of the global 
community” and “ensure the institutionalization of economic re-
form.”126  In a crucial step toward this end, the PRC passed the 
1982 Constitution, which restored its legal system by including, 
among other provisions, administration in accordance with law 
(e.g., administrative procedures, right to sue, compensation),127 the 
supremacy of the law,128 and equality of all before the law.129  Since 
then, China’s administrative law legislation has, albeit slowly, be-
gun to flourish.  More than 130 pieces of administrative legislation 
were passed between 1982 and 1988.130  In 1989, after almost a dec-
ade of legal reform, China promulgated its Administrative Litiga-
                                                   
123  See WILLEM VAN KEMENADE, CHINA, HONG KONG, TAIWAN, INC. 262 (Diane 
Webb trans., 1997);  Jerome Alan Cohen, Tiananmen and the Rule of Law, in THE 
BROKEN MIRROR: CHINA AFTER TIANANMEN 323, 325 (George Hicks ed., 1990) (de-
scribing Mao as “the modern world’s most famous proponent of lawlessness.”). 
124  See, e.g., Richard Flathman, Liberalism and the Suspect Enterprise of Political 
Institutionalization: the Case of the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 297 (Ian Shapiro 
ed., 1994) (examining the liberal philosophical underpinnings of many approaches 
to the rule of law).  However, some scholars think that democracy should be con-
ceptually separated from the principles of rule of law.  See, e.g., William C. Whit-
ford, The Rule of Law, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 723, 742;  Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in 
China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 49 (2001). 
125  See Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of 
Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China, 19 
BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 161, 163 (2001) [hereinafter Peerenboom, Globalization, Path 
Dependency and the Limits of Law] (acknowledging the impact of globalization in 
China’s refocusing of its administrative legal priorities). 
126  ZIMMERMAN, supra note 122, at 53. 
127  See, e.g., Xianfa [Constitution], art. 2, 5, 41 (1982) (P.R.C). 
128  Id. at art. 5. 
129  Id. at art. 23. 
130  See FENG LIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES IN CHINA 
116 (1996) (providing a review of notable developments in China’s administrative 
legal framework). 
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tion Law, which signaled the Chinese leadership’s endorsement of 
law-based administration.131 
The pace of administrative law legislation accelerated in the 
1990s.  This trajectory mirrors, in part, Chinese leaders’ focus on 
the transition to a “socialist economy,”132 and in part, the anticipa-
tion of China’s accession to the WTO.  While China moved toward 
a market-oriented economy in the process of globalization, a more 
predictable, accountable, and rule-based system of administration 
was needed.  As a corollary, a number of administrative laws were 
enacted to, on one hand, “rationalize governance, enhance admin-
istrative efficiency, and rein in local governments,” and, on the 
other, to “respond[ ] to people’s demands for greater protection of 
their rights and interests” in order to address emerging challeng-
es.133  The passage of the Administrative Supervision Regulations 
(1990),134 the Administrative Reconsideration Regulations (1990),135 
the State Compensation Law (1994),136 and the Administrative Pen-
alties Law (1996)137 are prime examples.  The former two pieces 
were, moreover, upgraded to laws in 1997 and 1999, respective-
ly.138 
                                                   
131  Xingzheng Susong Fa [Administrative Litigation Law] (promulgated by 
Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990) (P.R.C.) (highlighting the 
Chinese Government’s approach to codifying its domestic administrative law).  
Administrative Litigation Law was amended in November 2014.  For a recount of 
China’s judicial reform, see PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO RULE OF LAW, 
supra note 11, at 239–79. 
132  Xianfa [Constitution], art. 7 (1993) (P.R.C.) (expressing China’s commit-
ment to its socialist economy). 
133  RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO RULE OF LAW 399 (2002) 
[hereinafter Peerenboom, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO RULE OF LAW]. 
134  Xingzheng jiancha tiao li [Administrative Supervision Regulations] 
(promulgated by State Council, Dec. 9, 1990) (P.R.C.). 
135  Xingzheng fuyi tiao li [Administrative Reconsideration Regulations] 
(promulgated by Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China, Dec. 24, 
1990) (P.R.C). 
136  Guojia peichang fa [State Compensation Law] (promulgated by National 
People’s Congress Standing Committee, May 12, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) 
(P.R.C.). 
137  Xingzheng chufa fa [Administrative Penalties Law] (promulgated by Na-
tional People’s Congress, Mar. 17, 1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996) (P.R.C.). 
138  Xingzheng jiancha fa [Administrative Supervision Law] (promulgated by 
National People’s Congress Standing Committee, May 9, 1997, effective May 9, 
1997) (P.R.C);  Xingzheng fuyi fa [Administrative Reconsideration Law] (promul-
gated by National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Apr. 29, 1999, effective 
Oct. 1, 1999) (P.R.C.). 
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Even more dramatic administrative law reforms took place fol-
lowing China’s WTO accession in 2001.  Without repeating the 
WTO’s implications for China’s domestic governance—which has 
been addressed extensively elsewhere139—we instead focus on in-
stitutional reforms with a direct bearing on those key elements of 
regulatory coherence noted above. 
 
3.1.1.  Transparency and Public Consultation 
 
Transparency is one of the core disciplines under the WTO, re-
quiring Members to promptly publish all trade-related laws, regu-
lations, and other government measures of general application be-
fore their implementation.140  When compared to its Western 
counterpart, such a requirement was largely missing in China’s 
administrative tradition.  Thus, China was required to bolster its 
transparency obligations while negotiating its accession into the 
WTO.  Broadly, the Accession Protocol expanded China’s trans-
parency obligations via two specific measures.  First, China is re-
quired to enforce laws, regulations, or other measures that have 
been published.141  Second, China is required to make all laws, reg-
                                                   
139  See, e.g., Julia Ya Qin, Trade, Investment and Beyond: The Impact of WTO Ac-
cession on China’s Legal System, 191 CHINA Q. 720 (2007) [hereinafter Qin, The Im-
pact of WTO Accession on China’s Legal System];  CHIEN-HUEI WU, WTO AND THE 
GREATER CHINA: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2012) [hereinaf-
ter WU, WTO AND THE GREATER CHINA];  Chien-Huei Wu, How Does TRIPs Trans-
form Chinese Administrative Law? 8 (1) GLOBAL JURIST 1 (2008);  Ljiljana Biukovic, 
Selective Adaption of WTO Transparency Norms and Local Practices in China and Japan, 
11 (4) J. INT’L. ECON. L. 803(2008).  For the most recent and comprehensive account 
of China’s trade law capacity building, see Gregory Shaffer & Henry Gao, China’s 
Rise: How It Took on the U.S. at the WTO (UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper 
No. 2017-15), [https://perma.cc/T4KB-UGHV]. 
140  See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. X, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT];  General Agreement on Trade in 
Services arts. III, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS];  Agreement 
on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, art. 63, April 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
141  World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 10 November 2001, 
Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, para. 2.(c).1., 
WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Accession Protocol] (“China undertakes 
that only those laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or affecting 
trade in goods, services, TRIPs or the control of foreign exchange that are pub-
lished and readily available to other WTO Members, individuals and enterprises, 
shall be enforced[.]”). 
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ulations, and other measures falling within the aegis of the WTO 
available through an official journal on a regular basis and respond 
to requests for information within a prescribed time frame.142 
Several instruments were adopted in the 2000s in response to 
these demands.  The Legislation Law, promulgated in 2000, broke 
new ground by establishing a modernized administrative scheme.  
It also contributed to transparency in at least two ways.  First, Chi-
na’s legal system has long been viewed as a black box with no clear 
hierarchy between laws, regulations, and many other normative 
documents.  Past practice revealed that various “internal docu-
ments”—which should, in theory, have no binding effect—can be 
as equally effective as laws.143  Thus, the Legislation Law brought 
order to the normative chaos by clarifying the jurisdictions of the 
various authorities and establishing a standardized rulemaking 
process.144  Second, the Legislation Law fulfilled China’s obligation 
under the Accession Protocol by requiring laws, regulations, and 
other measures to be published in government gazettes.145  The 
Legislation Licensing Law, enacted in 2003, followed in the same 
vein by requiring the public disclosure of notable regulations on 
administrative licensing and prohibiting those that remained un-
disclosed from forming the basis of implementation of administra-
tive licensing.146  Moreover, save for concerns regarding national 
security, commercial secrets, and privacy, the Administrative Li-
censing Law required the government to disclose implementation 
of administrative licensing and the results thereof.147  Shortly 
thereafter, in 2004, the State Council, in a guiding document called 
“Implementation Outline to Comprehensively Move Forward 
                                                   
142  Id. paras. 2(c)2–3. 
143  Xiaoxiao Li, Adaption to WTO Standards: Changes and Adjustments to Busi-
ness Laws and Regulations, in MODERN CHINESE LEGAL REFORM: NEW PERSPECTIVES 
151, 154–55 (XiaoBing Li & Qiang Fang eds., 2013) (noting that “China habitually 
went beyond the publicly announced laws and regulations to develop a number 
of 'internal decisions' or 'official documents,' which became more important than 
the laws.”). 
144  Lifa Fa Legislation Law arts. 1, 7 (promulgated by Nat'l People's Cong., 
Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000; amended in Mar. 15, 2015);  see also 
Ohnesorge, supra note 122, at 138 (discussing, in Part III. A. 3, the evolution and 
standardizing effect of the Legislative Law on China’s domestic administrative 
framework). 
145  Legislation Law, supra note 144, arts. 52, 62, 70. 
146  Xingzheng xuke fa [Administrative Licensing Law] (adopted by Standing 
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 27, 2003, effective July 1, 2004.) art. 5. 
147  Id. 
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Administration According to the Law,” again underscored the im-
portance of transparency in ensuring rule-based administration 
across government agencies at all levels.148 
Moreover, as part of its WTO-Plus obligations under the Acces-
sion Protocol, China went beyond the passive information disclo-
sure requirements by providing “a reasonable period for comment 
to the appropriate authorities before such measures are imple-
mented,” with exceptions for certain situations.149  China’s efforts 
can best be exemplified, once again, by the Legislation Law, which 
committed China to “openness” by accommodating “people’s par-
ticipation in legislative activities through various channels” since 
its promulgation in 2000.150  Several follow-up initiatives have also 
been developed with this goal.  In 2001, the State Council issued 
the “Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administra-
tive Regulations”151 and “Regulations on Procedures for the For-
mulation of Rules”152 to implement the Legislation Law.  While the 
Legislation Law offered comment opportunities in general, these 
two rules set forth detailed procedural requirements for govern-
ment agencies to engage stakeholders.  Generally, in drafting ad-
ministrative regulations and rules, drafting agencies should solicit 
the opinions of relevant agencies, organizations, and citizens 
through symposia, panel discussions, hearings, or otherwise.153  
Next, when draft regulations and rules are submitted for approval 
by supervisory bodies, an introductory note regarding how these 
                                                   
148   Quanmian tuijin yifa xingzheng shishi gangyao [Implementation Outline 
to Comprehensively Move Forward Administration According to the Law] [here-
inafter 2004 Implementation Outline] (adopted by the State Council, Mar. 22, 
2004). 
149  Accession Protocol, supra note 141, para. 2.(C).  
150   Legislation Law, supra note 144, art. 5. 
151  Xíngzheng fagui zhiding chengxu tiaoli [Regulations on Procedures for 
the Formulation of Administrative Regulations] (issued by the State Council, Nov. 
16, 2001, effective on Jan. 1, 2002) art. 11. 
152  Guizhang zhiding chengxu tiaoli [Regulations on Procedures for the 
Formulation of Rules] (issued by the State Council, Nov. 16, 2001, effective on Jan. 
1, 2002). 
153  See, e.g., id., arts. 14–15 (“Practical experience should be summed up, and 
the opinions of relevant organs, organizations and citizens shall be extensively 
listened to.”);  Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative 
Regulations, supra note 151, art. 12 (“Practical experience should be summed up, 
and the opinions of relevant organs, organizations and citizens shall be extensive-
ly solicited.”). 
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opinions are addressed is needed.154  There might be a second 
chance for public comment at the approval stage if the draft for 
approval involves, in the case of regulations, “major or difficult is-
sues,” “immediate interests of citizens, legal persons, or other or-
ganizations,” or important matters approved by the State Coun-
cil,155 and, in the case of rules, “major issues.”156  Similar procedural 
requirements were also included in the Administrative Licensing 
Law and the 2004 Implementation Outline: the former required the 
incorporation of some sort of public consultation in laws and/or 
regulations relating to administrative licensing,157 while the latter 
underscored the importance of due process by protecting stake-
holders’ right to information, comment, and remedy.158  
 
 
3.1.2.  Regulatory Impact Analysis  
 
Although regulatory impact analysis was not included in its 
WTO-Plus obligations, China also took steps to revise its adminis-
trative laws to incorporate certain elements of RIA.  A good illus-
tration of such steps is the above-mentioned Regulations on Proce-
dures for the Formulation of Administrative Regulations and 
Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative 
Rules.  Under the former, for instance, agencies were required to 
delineate key issues and the manner in which the proposed project 
addressed them before the State Council included the project in its 
annual work plan at the beginning of each year.159  Moreover, at 
                                                   
154  See, e.g., Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Rules, supra 
note 152, art. 25 (“A draft rule and its explanation shall be signed by the principal 
responsible person of the legislative affairs office, who shall put forward a pro-
posal that the draft rule and its explanation be submitted to the relevant meeting . 
. . for deliberation.”). 
155  Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative Regula-
tions, supra note 151, arts. 19, 21, 22. 
156  Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Rules, supra note 152, 
arts. 21, 23 (“Legislative affairs offices shall send draft rules for examination . . . to 
relevant organs, organizations and experts to solicit their opinions.”). 
157  Administrative Licensing Law, supra note 145, art. 19 (“Where an administrative 
license is to be established by means of drafting a law . . . the drafting entity shall consult the opinions through hearing 
and argumentation[.]”). 
158   2004 Implementation Outline, supra note 148, para. 5. 
159  Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative Regula-
tions, supra note 151, arts. 6–8 (articulating the procedure for preparing an annual 
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the drafting stage, the administrative agencies were to follow the 
principles that administrative regulations represented, including 
“scientifically regulating administrative acts, promoting the shift of 
government functions toward economic adjustment, social man-
agement and public service.”160  Thus, agencies were to conduct 
“in-depth investigations and researches [sic]” during the drafting 
process and explain the “necessity” of such regulation for the State 
Council’s examination.161  These mandates were later underscored 
by the 2004 Implementation Outline, which directs government 
agencies to formulate a “science-based” administrative decision-
making process to improve administrative efficiency.162  The 2004 
Implementation Outline requires drafting agencies to choose the 
option that is least harmful to the people when multiple scenarios 
can serve the same administrative purpose.163  Moreover, the 2004 
Implementation Outline instructs that, as a systemic matter, gov-
ernment agencies should take into account not only the ex-ante 
costs of the rulemaking process, but also ex-post social costs and 
law enforcement expenses by exploring cost-effective analysis 
mechanisms of government legislation—especially those related to 
economic affairs.164 
3.1.2.1.  Interagency Coordination and Compatibility  
 
One of the problems facing China’s trading partners is the 
complicated way in which its rulemaking authority is exercised.  
Since China’s economic reform in 1978, the emphasis on rulemak-
ing and the rule of law has contributed to a significant expansion 
in the promulgation of normative documents at all levels of gov-
ernment.165  Because several entities were vested with the power to 
legislate, the rulemaking arena was described as a “bewildering 
and inconsistent array of laws, regulations, provisions, measures, 
                                                                                                                   
legislation working plan). 
160  Id. art. 11.1. 
161   Id. arts. 12, 16. 
162  2004 Implementation Outline, supra note 148, §§ 2.2, 3.5. 
163  See id. § 3.5. 
164   See id. § 6.17. 
165  See Laura Paler, China’s Legislation Law and the Making of a More Orderly 
and Representative Legislative System, THE CHINA Q., 302 (2005) (examining “the sig-
nificance of the Legislation Law (lifa la), passed by the National People’s Congress 
(NPC) in March 2000.”). 
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directives, notices, decisions, and explanations, all claiming to be 
normatively binding and treated as such by the creating entity.”166  
These normative documents resulted in numerous contradictions, 
tensions, and ambiguities within the rulemaking system, which 
slowed economic development and undermined the confidence of 
citizens and foreign investors in the legal system.167  Such concerns 
were intensified by China’s WTO accession.168  To address these 
concerns, China was required by the Accession Protocol to admin-
ister all of the laws, regulations, and other measures of central and 
local governments in a “uniform, impartial and reasonable man-
ner,” and invalidate all local rules and measures inconsistent with 
its WTO obligations.169  As a result, China embarked upon a series 
of clean-up campaigns.  In October 2001, the State Council began to 
review 756 administrative regulations issued before the end of 
2000—71 of which were invalidated—and required local govern-
ments to address rules and measures incompatible with the WTO 
disciplines.170  Within three years of its WTO accession, China re-
vised or terminated nearly 190,000 local rules and measures;  by 
2005, some 3,000 laws, regulations, and rules were also amended.171 
The sweeping institutional reform went beyond the review of 
existing legal frameworks.  To restore the order of the rulemaking 
                                                   
166  Peerenboom, Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the PRC, supra 
note 120, at 205;  see, e.g., Jan Michiei Otto & Yuwen Li, An Overview of Lawmaking 
in China, in LAWMAKING IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1, 1–18 (Jan Michiel 
Otto et al. eds., 2000) (highlighting China’s evolution from a ‘non-law’ system to a 
system with a robust legislative program). 
167  See Perry Keller, Source of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 711 
(1994) (discussing the complexity and inconsistency within China’s legal system 
and their effects on the reliable application of the law). 
168  Qin, The Impact of WTO Accession on China’s Legal System, supra note 139, at 
736.  In China, entrenched localism, from time to time, resulted in local rules that 
contradict with laws and regulations passed by the central government.  Thus, 
these special commitments were included to harness local protectionism.  
169  Accession Protocol, supra note 141, para. 2. (A). 
170  See, e.g., SANG BAICHUAN ET AL. (桑百川等合着), TONGCHOU GUONEI 
FAZHAN HE DUIWAI KAIFANG （统筹国内发展和对外开放）[COORDINATING 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT AND OPEN-UP] 31 (2011). 
171  Wan Xuezhong（万学忠）& Zhang Wei（张维), Rushi shi nian tuidong 
zhongguo fazhi Jincheng（入世十年推动中国法治进程 [To Promote the Rule of 
Law in Ten Years of the WTO Accession], NEWSLETTER OF THE LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS 
OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL (Dec. 9, 2011), 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2011-
12/09/content_3185561.htm [https://perma.cc/MJP2-CKML] (last visited: Apr. 
25, 2017). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
 
172 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 40:1 
 
paradigm, Chinese leaders adopted a forward-looking approach 
by delimiting the jurisdiction of each rulemaking body and formu-
lating a method to address multi-level legislative conflicts in the 
Legislation Law.  In addition to spelling out the hierarchical legal 
order supporting the Constitution,172 the Legislation Law drew a 
clear division between the rulemaking power of the National Peo-
ple’s Congress and other entities by specifying ten broad areas ex-
clusively governed by laws, while underscoring the primacy of the 
National People’s Congress through the right to annul normative 
documents of central administrative bodies or local governments 
found to be inconsistent with the Constitution and laws.173  Given 
the long-simmering frustrations over confusion and ambiguities 
within the legal system, much of the design of the Legislation Law 
can be seen as a pushback from the National People’s Congress to 
harness “the rush of administrative regulations issued by govern-
ments at various levels” and the ramifications that followed.174 
Later, the Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of 
Administrative Regulations and the Regulations on Procedures for 
the Formulation of Rules both set forth detailed requirements to 
avoid potential conflicts inherent in the multi-level rulemaking 
process.  The former, for instance, seemed to adopt the APA model 
by coordinating rulemaking initiatives through annual working 
plans.  Article 7 provides in relevant part:  
Where the relevant departments of the State Council deem 
that there is a need to formulate administrative regulations, 
they shall . . . state the main issues to be solved by such pro-
jects, the guidelines and policies that such projects are 
based on and the main systems to be established by such 
projects.175 
                                                   
172  At the top of the pyramid is Constitution, followed by “falu” (laws, 
promulgated by the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee), 
“fagui” (regulations, enacted by the State Council and the sub-national people’s 
congress), and “guizhang” (rules, issued by central government ministries and 
local governments).  Legislation Law, supra note 144, arts. 78–82. 
173  See Keith J. Hand, Understanding China’s System for Addressing Legislative 
Conflicts: Capacity Challenges and the Search for Legislative Harmony, 26 COLUM. J. 
ASIAN L. 139, 191–217 (2013) (articulating the practical difficulty of addressing leg-
islative disorder and suggesting what can be done).  The earliest efforts to create 
such a system can be dated back to the 1982 Constitution and certain organic laws. 
174  See Paler, supra note 165, at 308 (citing NPC Commission to Formulate 
Legislation Law, Xinhua, 25 October 1999). 
175  Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative Regula-
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Such control also existed in the drafting stage.  Article 13 of the 
Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative 
Regulations, for instance, required the drafting agency to “reach a 
consensus with other departments on the provisions that involve 
their powers and responsibilities or the provisions that are closely 
related to them.”176  In cases in which consensus was not reached 
after “sufficient consultation,” the drafting agency was obliged to 
“state the circumstances of and the reasons for such non-consensus 
when submitting the draft of administrative regulations for exami-
nation.”177 
 
3.1.2.2.  Administrative and Judicial Review 
 
In tandem with its economic reform, China began to curtail the 
power of bureaucratic agencies in Administrative Litigation Law, 
as effective in 1990.  The fundamental tenet of the 1990 Administra-
tive Litigation Law was the support of judicial oversight to curb 
the abuse of administrative power and to promote accountability 
of government officials.178  Despite such efforts, there were signifi-
cant limits to the competence of the courts.  Of greatest relevance 
for the present purpose are the standard of review and the scope of 
judicial oversight.  First, arguably, the Administrative Litigation 
Law can be narrowly read to limit judicial review to the legality, 
and not the appropriateness, of administrative decisions.179  The 
Law generally barred the courts from substituting their own judg-
ments for those of administrative entities.180  Second, and more 
                                                                                                                   
tions, supra note 151, art. 7. 
176  Id. art. 13. 
177  Id. 
178  See Pitman B. Potter, Globalization and Economic Regulation in China: Selec-
tive Adaption of Globalized Norms and Practices, 2 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 119, 
137 (2003) (examining mechanisms of judicial review of administrative decisions). 
179  Id.  However, there was a gray zone, as Article 54 of Administrative Liti-
gation Law did empower the courts to revoke the administrative decisions involv-
ing “abuse of authority” and “excess of authority.”  Administrative Litigation 
Law, supra note 131, arts. 5, 54.  Scholars were divided on the way to interpret 
these vague terms.  See Peerenboom, Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in 
the PRC, supra note 120, at 237–38 (arguing that “[t]he more robust the interpreta-
tion, the closer the court gets to substituting its own judgment and replacing a re-
view of legality with a review of appropriateness . . . . PRC scholars are even more 
divided about the meaning of abuse of authority.”). 
180  Potter, supra note 178, at 138–39.  
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crucially, judicial review was limited to concrete administrative 
acts; the validity of administrative laws, regulations, and orders of 
general application, as well as administrative decisions declared 
final by applicable laws, were exempt from judicial oversight.181  
Overall, the Administrative Litigation Law of 1990 was limited in 
its effectiveness. 
China’s weak judiciary in the administrative realm faced criti-
cal challenges as a result of its WTO membership.  To ensure that 
regulatory measures affecting trade are fairly administered, all 
WTO Members are obliged, as a general rule, to offer the oppor-
tunity for an objective and impartial review of administrative deci-
sions.182  China’s Accession Protocol took a similar but harsher ap-
proach by requiring China to “establish, or designate, and 
maintain tribunals, contact points and procedures for the prompt 
review of all administrative actions relating to the implementation 
of laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings 
of general application,” as referenced in the relevant provisions 
under the GATT, GATS, and TRIPs.183  Such a tribunal, as the Ac-
cession Protocol provided, shall be “impartial and independent” of 
the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement.184  While 
                                                   
181  Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 131, art. 12. 
182  See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153, art. X: 3 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994] (instat-
ing tribunals or procedures for review and correction of administrative actions);  
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 
I.L.M. 1167, art. 6.2 (1994) [hereinafter GATS] (requiring administrative tribunals 
or procedures to process prompt review of administrative decisions as called for);  
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197, art. 41:4. (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agree-
ment] (establishing the opportunity for a judicial authority to review administra-
tive decisions).  
183  Accession Protocol, supra note 141, para. 2. (D). 
184  Id.  GATT 1994 Article X: 3(c) provides that the existing procedures in 
force on the date of the GATT do not need to be substituted or eliminated even if 
they are not “fully or formally independent of the agencies entrusted with admin-
istrative enforcement” so long as such procedures, as a matter of fact, offer “objec-
tive and impartial” review;  see GATT, supra note 182, art. X: 3(c).  For a detailed 
comparison between judicial review requirement under the GATT, GATS, TRIPs, 
and China’s Accession Protocol, see Chien-Huei Wu, Mission (Im)Possible? Could 
the WTO Save Chinese Courts? 3 (2) NAT’L TAIWAN UNIV. L. REV. 61 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Wu, Mission (Im)Possible] (examining China’s WTO obligation in the context of 
global standards of independence). 
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judicial review obligations under WTO-covered agreements are 
subject to compatibility requirements with the existing domestic 
legal framework, China’s judicial review obligations are uncondi-
tional.185  Moreover, the Accession Protocol prescribed that “indi-
viduals and enterprises affected by any administrative action” 
shall havve the opportunity to appeal in all cases to a judicial 
body.186 
These requirements implicated the manner in which China dis-
ciplined its regulatory agencies.  In anticipation of its WTO acces-
sion, China, as noted above, revised and upgraded the Administra-
tive Reconsideration Regulation to the Administrative 
Reconsideration Law, offering a hierarchical intra-agency review of 
administrative acts.187  Unlike the Administrative Litigation Law of 
1990, the Administrative Reconsideration Law expanded the scope 
of review by subjecting certain abstract administrative acts to ad-
ministrative reconsideration.188  China’s WTO accession was short-
ly followed by legislative amendments and judicial interpretations 
that granted rights to appeal for all WTO-related cases.189  These 
review mechanisms were built upon, among others, the Adminis-
                                                   
185  See Wu, Mission (Im)Possible, supra note 184, at 65 (discussing China’s “in-
dependent judicial review” obligation and what that obligation entails). 
186  Accession Protocol, supra note 141, para. 2. (D);  see also Julia Ya Qin, 
“WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the WTO Legal System: An Ap-
praisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 483, 496 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Qin, An Appraisal of the China’s Accession Protocol] (arguing that such obligation 
exceeded the WTO general requirements.  For instance, there is no reference to 
appeal of a tribunal decision in the GATS, while appeal to a court of the decision 
by an independent tribunal under the GATT Article X is merely referred to as a 
“possibility.”). 
187  See Ohnesorge, supra note 122, at 141 (illustrating the steps taken by Chi-
na to develop a uniform standard for administrative litigation). 
188  Administrative Reconsideration Law, supra note 137, art. 7. 
189  In 2002, China’s Supreme Court issued three judicial interpretations to 
facilitate the judicial review of WTO-related administrative decisions: Regulations 
on Several Problems in the Trial of Trade-Related Administrative Litigation Cases, 
Regulations on the Application of Law in the Trial of Anti-Subsidy Administra-
tive Litigation, and Regulations on the Application of Law in the Trial of Anti-
Dumping.  In China, these judicial interpretations and opinions are essentially 
binding upon lower courts.  See generally Nanping Liu, “Legal Precedents” with Chi-
nese Characteristics: Published Cases in the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court, 5 J. 
CHINESE L. 107 (1991) (examining the extent to which decisions by the Supreme 
People’s Court are considered precedential in China’s legal system);  Susan Find-
er, The Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 145 
(1993) (discussing the role of the Supreme People’s Court in the context of China’s 
legal tradition). 
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trative Licensing Law and Legislation Law, which set boundaries 
to control the conduct of public officials.  Although there is much 
room for improvement, on balance, as elaborated below, these and 
many other efforts in connection with WTO membership illustrate 
changes in Chinese review systems of administrative decisions 
concerning trade. 
 
3.2.  Recent Developments in Core Elements of Regulatory Coherence 
 
Recent years have witnessed China’s intensified efforts in the 
pursuit of more efficient and effective administration.  During the 
Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 
held in October 2007, Chinese leaders reaffirmed their policy, stat-
ing:  “We must keep to the path of political development under so-
cialism with Chinese characteristics, and integrate the leadership of 
the Party, the position of the people as masters of the country, and 
the rule of law.”190  Further, political reforms must be oriented to-
ward “socialist democracy” by improving institutions for democ-
racy and diversifying relevant channels to engage citizens in the 
decision-making process.191  Governments should therefore “guar-
antee the people’s rights to be informed, to participate, to be heard, 
and to oversee.”192 
At about the same time, the State Council undertook a parallel 
initiative by issuing the Regulation on the Disclosure of Government 
Information, another milestone in China’s administrative law re-
gime.193  Under this Regulation, governments at all levels are re-
quired to establish a process for disseminating “government in-
formation”—that is, “information made or obtained by 
administrative organs in the course of exercising their responsibili-
ties and recorded and stored in a given form.”194  Specifically, gov-
ernment agencies should disclose, on their own initiative, infor-
mation that “involves the vital interests of citizens, legal persons or 
                                                   
190  Hu Jintao, Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Com-
munist Party of China, Oct. 15, 2007, part VI. 
191  Id.  
192  Id. 
193  Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli [Regulation 
on the Disclosure of Government Information] (promulgated by the State Council, 
Apr. 5, 2007, effective May 1, 2008). 
194  Id. arts. 2, 4. 
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other organizations,” “needs to be extensively known or partici-
pated in by the general public,” “shows the structure, function and 
working procedures of and other matters relating to the adminis-
trative organ,” and “other information that should be disclosed on 
the administrative organ’s own initiative according to laws, regula-
tions, and relevant state provisions.”195  Disclosures should be 
made “promptly and accurately” based on “the principles of jus-
tice, fairness, and convenience to the people.”196  Such voluntary 
disclosure, as a general rule, must be done within twenty business 
days from the date the information is introduced or changed.197  
Government agencies should, moreover, respond to disclosure re-
quests from the public within fifteen to thirty business days upon 
receipt of such requests.198  
Such disclosure obligations were implemented through de-
tailed action plans.  Launched in 2008 under the aegis of the State 
Council, the Legislative Affairs Office was delegated the authority 
to maintain the website of the China legislative information net-
work system, to serve as a link to local government legislative af-
fairs offices, and to publish laws, regulations, and departmental 
rules, as well as drafts which were open for comment.199  Later, in 
2010, the Supreme People’s Court issued the “Provisions of the Su-
preme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of 
Administrative Cases of Government Information Disclosure,” of-
fering administrative remedies in cases in which government 
agencies failed to fulfill disclosure obligations.200  The State Council 
in 2010 issued “Opinions of the State Council on Strengthening the 
Building of a Government Ruled by Law.”201  Based upon the 2004 
                                                   
195  Id. art. 9. 
196  Id. arts. 5, 6. 
art. 18. 
198  Id. art. 24. 
199  Guowuyuan guanyu jigou shezhi de tongzhi (国务院关于机构设置的通知) 
[Notice of the State Council on the Establishment of Institutions] (compiled by 
State Council Legislative Office, Jan. 17, 2007, effective Apr. 24, 2008), 
CLI.2.312128(EN) (Lawinfochina). 
200  Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli zhengfu xinxi gongkai xingzheng 
anjian ruogan wenti de guiding (最高人民法院关于审理政府信息公开行政案件若
干问题的规定) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues con-
cerning the Trial of Administrative Cases about Open Government Information] 
(promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, July 29, 2011; effective Aug. 13, 
2011), CLI.3.156701(EN) (Lawinfochina). 
201  Guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang fazhi zhengfu jianshe de yijian (国务院关于
加强法治政府建设的意见) [Opinions of the State Council on Strengthening the 
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Implementation Outline, the Opinions clarified the obligations of 
regulatory agencies in the rulemaking process.  In addition to 
transparency, central and local administrative agencies were re-
quired to undertake “public solicitation of opinions, legality exam-
ination, and collective discussions” before issuing any “normative 
documents”—documents with direct, binding effects on the rights 
and obligations of citizens, legal persons, or other organizations.202  
To improve the quality of legal institutions, governments were to 
formulate and incorporate “cost-benefit analysis,” “social risk ap-
praisal,” and “post-evaluation of government legislation” mecha-
nisms in the decision-making process in general,203 while conduct-
ing “public hearings,” “expert consultations,” and “risk 
assessments” for all major policy decisions relating to economic or 
social development and the direct interests of the people.204  More-
over, the Opinions stressed that public participation must be 
“broadly representative,” public opinions should be considered,205 
and feedback on such opinions and the underlying reasons should 
be published or addressed in a proper manner.206  All major poli-
cymaking processes were contingent upon risk assessments:  “sci-
entific surveys” and “comprehensive discussions of all sorts of 
risks that may be triggered by the policy” would enable govern-
ments to “determine risk levels and formulate corresponding rec-
onciliation and management plans.”207  
The movement toward administration reforms was reaffirmed 
by Chinese leaders through the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, issued on 
March 14, 2011.208  All of the key elements of regulatory coher-
ence—transparency, public participation, risk assessments, and re-
view—were once again underscored.  Since then, China has taken 
two additional steps to perfect the administrative law regime.  
                                                                                                                   
Building of a Government Ruled by Law (promulgated by the State Council Leg-
islative Office, Oct. 10, 2010), CLI.2.139971(EN) (Lawinfochina). 
202  Id. at III. 9. 
203  Id. at III. 7. 
204  Id. at IV. 11–12. 
205  Id. at IV. 11. 
206  Id. 
207  Id. at IV. 12. 
208  Guomin Jingji he Shehui Fazhan Di Shier Ge Wunian Guihua Gangyao (
国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要) [The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Na-
tional Economic and Social Development] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Mar. 14, 2011, effective Mar. 14, 2011). 
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With a view toward a “well-off society” and deepened rule-based 
administration, the State Council in December 2015 repealed the 
2010 Opinions by launching a multi-year program, namely, the 
“Implementation Outline for Building a Government Ruled by 
Law (2015-2020).”209  This 2015 Outline sought to enhance adminis-
trative efficiency by optimizing the structures and functions of 
regulatory agencies, while solving the problems of inter-agency 
conflicts and local protectionism.  Through strict adherence to the 
Legislation Law and the key elements mentioned above, the State 
Council sought to promote a prompt, systemic, problem-solving, 
and effective legislative regime.  
In theory, much of these developments in the contemporary 
Chinese administrative regime appear to indicate its compatibility 
with the concept of regulatory coherence.  As a matter of practice, 
however, there are various obstacles due to China’s underlying po-
litical economy that may limit the role China can play in the emer-
gence of global regulatory coherence. 
 
4.  CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD REGULATORY COHERENCE 
 
While China’s administrative law system appears to—at least 
nominally—embrace regulatory coherence, whether and how this 
concept can be translated into practice depends upon the country’s 
unique context.  The political, social, and cultural context for the 
design and evolution of China’s legal infrastructure is a critical 
force in the development of regulatory coherence, both in discus-
sion and in practice, in China and beyond.  We leave for a later 
study a critical additional concern—the extra financial and admin-
istrative burden on developing countries stemming from regulato-
ry coherence, as well as the risk of regulatory capture by powerful 
multinational enterprises on an international scale—which may 
challenge the very emergence of this concept as the global default 
rule.210 
                                                   
209  Fazhi zhengfu jianshe shishi gangyao (法治政府建设实施纲要 (2015–
2020)) [Implementation Outline for Building a Government Ruled by Law (2015–
2020)] (promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 23, 2015), CLI.5.261778(EN) (Law-
infochina). 
210  The notion of regulatory coherence—or good regulatory practices—
mirrors in a way what has been criticized by Antony Anghie in discussing the use 
of “good governance” as a means to imperial globalization and recolonization.  As 
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4.1.  The Future of Regulatory Coherence: A Thorny Embrace for 
China’s PTAs?  
 
Although legal and political reforms over the past few decades 
have largely transformed the Chinese administrative law regime, 
the overall pattern of China’s PTAs demonstrates its reluctance to 
fully embrace regulatory coherence.  As of this writing, China has 
concluded PTAs with fourteen trading partners, including Austral-
ia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Chile, 
Costa Rica, Georgia, Hong Kong, Iceland, Macau, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, and Peru, while 
negotiating or updating another eleven PTAs, including the RCEP. 
211  
The overall structure of these PTAs reveals a rather complex 
pattern in China’s approach to regulatory coherence.  Unlike recent 
practice in megaregional trade negotiations, none of the above-
mentioned Chinese PTAs contains a stand-alone chapter on regula-
tory coherence.  These PTAs, instead, focus intently on regulatory 
cooperation by establishing a detailed process of interaction be-
tween Chinese regulatory agencies and their foreign counterparts 
through various schemes, such as mutual recognition agreements 
or arrangements (MRAs), information sharing, and the establish-
ment of oversight bodies.  A closer examination of the provisions 
under these PTAs, however, reveals some threads that link to regu-
latory coherence.  First, some of China’s PTAs do refer to “good 
regulatory practice.”  The China–Switzerland FTA, for instance, 
requires both Parties to incorporate good regulatory practice as 
part of the cooperation mechanism.  Article 6.5 reads in relevant 
                                                                                                                   
argued by Anghie, good governance may appear to be a neutral concept, but in 
fact reflects and reproduces a set of principles related to free markets, democracy, 
and the rule of law created and promoted by the West and further imposed on the 
rest of the world.  See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 247–54 (2005).  Jane Kelsey specifically argued that prepa-
ration of RIA documents and the notice and comment would impose significant 
budgetary burdens on low-income developing countries, which, due to their lim-
ited resources, have other pressing issues to address.  See Kelsey, supra note 118, at 
3. 
211  See generally CHINA FTA NETWORK, 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/KAC5-6LTU] 
(last visited Sep. 23, 2017). 
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part:  
With a view to increasing their mutual understanding of 
their respective systems, enhancing capacity building and 
facilitating bilateral trade, the Parties shall strengthen their 
technical cooperation in the following areas: . . .  
(b) communication between each other’s competent author-
ities, exchange of information in respect of technical regula-
tions, standards, conformity assessment procedures and 
good regulatory practice.212 
Similar provisions can be found in China’s PTAs vis-à-vis Aus-
tralia,213 New Zealand,214 Iceland,215 and Costa Rica.216  Such provi-
sions lead to two immediate observations.  First, while these provi-
sions appear to link good regulatory practice to the context of 
technical barriers to trade, nowhere in these PTAs is the term 
“good regulatory practice” defined.  The only exception is Article 
72.3 of the China–Costa Rica FTA, which provides that “the Parties 
recognize the importance of applying good regulatory practice un-
der the TBT Agreement, taking into consideration the decisions 
and recommendations adopted by the WTO Committee on Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade . . . ”217  Through the incorporation of the 
TBT Committee Decision, the notion of good regulatory practice 
should be read, at least in the context of the China–Costa Rica FTA, 
to include, among other items, transparency and public consulta-
tion schemes, regulatory impact assessment, approaches to mini-
mize burdens on economic operators, review mechanisms for exist-
ing technical regulations and conformity assessment, and 
consideration of special development, financial, and trade needs of 
developing countries.218  Viewed in this light, good regulatory 
                                                   
212  Free Trade Agreement, China–Switz., July 6, 2013, art. 6.5 [hereinafter 
China–Switzerland FTA]. 
213  Free Trade Agreement, China–Austl., June 17, 2015, art. 6.11 [hereinafter 
China–Australia FTA]. 
214  Free Trade Agreement, China–N.Z., Apr. 7, 2008, art. 96 [hereinafter Chi-
na–New Zealand FTA]. 
215  Free Trade Agreement, China–Ice., Apr. 15, 2013, art. 20 [hereinafter Chi-
na–Iceland FTA]. 
216  Free Trade Agreement, China–Costa Rica, Apr. 8, 2010, art. 72 [hereinafter 
China–Costa Rica FTA]. 
217  Id. art. 72.3. 
218  See WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Decisions and Recom-
mendations Adopted by the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade Since 1 Jan-
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practice reflects much of what is required by regulatory coherence.  
Nevertheless, China’s obligation toward regulatory coherence is 
softened by the proviso that the Parties recognize.  Second, while 
regulatory coherence by nature represents a set of overarching 
principles guiding a domestic regulatory process, China limits the 
scope of good regulatory practice exclusively to the TBT context.  
This practice is contrary to the arrangements in TPP and the pro-
posed negotiation text of TTIP. 
Thus, it appears that China has been inclined to dilute the im-
portance of regulatory coherence, either by keeping the language 
vague or the scope of application narrow.  In our opinion, such a 
practice reflects the Chinese government’s view of its legal and po-
litical institutions—despite extensive reform—as below the desired 
conditions to assume full commitments with respect to regulatory 
coherence.  This raises an immediate question:  what hurdle, if any, 
lies ahead of China’s march towards regulatory coherence?  This 
question may implicate not only the manner in which China ad-
dresses regulatory coherence in its current PTAs, but also the way 
it negotiates relevant terms in the RCEP as well as OBOR settings 
and beyond.  
 
4.2.  Panda in the Room:  Coping with the Democratic Ramifications of 
Regulatory Coherence  
 
Regulatory coherence is, in essence, a multifaceted concept that 
may go beyond regulatory modernization by touching upon politi-
cally sensitive issues like government accountability, democratic 
control, and the rule of law.  Whether and the extent to which Chi-
na will implement all of these elements has direct bearing on the 
future of global regulatory coherence and merits further explora-
tion.  We argue that China has embraced some sort of experimental 
approach by implementing a “thin” regulatory coherence and re-
mains ambivalent and cautious towards a “thicker” version of reg-
ulatory coherence.219  As analyzed below, we argue that the gap be-
                                                                                                                   
uary 1995, WTO Doc. G/TBT/1/Rev.13 (adopted Mar. 8, 2017). 
219  Here we build upon the “thin rule of law” and “thick rule of law” concep-
tual framework advanced by Randall Peerenboom in addressing China’s legal re-
form.  According to Peerenboom’s theory, the thin version understands rule of 
law in instrumental terms, addressing the formal aspects of a government system, 
regardless of political underpinnings (e.g., democratic or non-democratic, capital-
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tween laws on the books and laws in action appears significant in 
terms of the core elements of regulatory coherence. 
First, numerous aspects of China’s policymaking remain com-
plex and opaque, which leaves further room for administrative 
discretion and corruption.220  Despite the progress in transparency, 
government information disclosure is subject to certain qualifica-
tions.  Administrative agencies, for instance, should disclose in-
formation that “involves the vital interests of citizens, legal persons 
or other organizations,” “needs to be extensively known or partici-
pated in by the general public,” and “shows the structure, function 
and working procedures of and other matters relating to the ad-
ministrative organs.” 221  Further, this information “should [be] 
disclose[d] on . . . [the administrative organ’s] own initiative” ac-
cording to laws, regulations and relevant state provisions.222  
Moreover, agencies are required to review whether such disclosure 
is consistent with the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Safeguarding State Secrets223 and take into account “state security, 
public security, economic security, and social stability.”224  Thus, 
these provisions create room for discretion, which in turn under-
mines the transparency requirement.  As an illustration, China’s 
environmental protection agencies at the central and local levels 
have been repeatedly attacked for labeling environmental data as a 
“national secrets” issue and refusing relevant disclosure.225 
Similarly, while the public consultation function is designed as 
a means of rationalizing the administrative rulemaking process, its 
                                                                                                                   
ism, or socialism).  The thick version, by contrast, is concerned about legitimizing 
regulatory acts by incorporating adequate substantive elements into a law.  See 
generally RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO RULE OF LAW 4–6 (2002). 
220  See Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretari-
at—China Revision, at 11, WT/TPR/S/264/Rev.1 (July 20, 2012). 
221  See Regulation on the Disclosure of Government Information, supra note 
193, at art. 9. 
222  Id. 
223  Id. at art. 14. 
224  Id. at art. 8. 
225  See Robert V. Percival & Zhao Huiyu, The Role of Civil Society in Environ-
mental Governance in the United States and China, 24 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 141, 
179–80 (2013) (comparing government information disclosure of China and the 
U.S.); see also Xin huanbao fa xiaoguo pinggu: Xinxi gongkai reng bu lixiang (新环保法
效果评估：信息公开仍不理想) [An Evaluation of New Environmental Law: In-
formation Disclosure is Far From Ideal], 
http://www.ogichina.org/article/125/28624.html [https://perma.cc/8EW6-
CV3Q] (last visited: May 8, 2017).  
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function could be undermined by the manner in which drafting 
bodies interpret and carry out such a mandate in practice.  In prac-
tice, public participation in the rulemaking processes in China re-
mains relatively underdeveloped, with the primary objective being 
to inform the public rather than to solicit opinions for improving 
rulemaking.226  As a matter of interpretation, although the Legisla-
tion Law and its implementing regulations include the stage of no-
tice and comment in the rulemaking process, these provisions can 
arguably be interpreted as “voluntary,” leaving discretion to the 
drafting agencies.227  Even when administrative bodies are willing 
to include notice and comment as part of their rulemaking practice, 
capacity building and financial burden appear to be critical chal-
lenges.  According to Paler, “Hearing organizers have grappled 
with how to balance between witnesses and audience members, to 
ascertain when to hold a hearing and on what project, to reach re-
sults after official debate, and to generate interest in the face of 
public apathy.”228  Thus, frustration over procedural irregularities 
remains.  Additionally, because hearing costs are greater than ex-
pert consultation, the source of funds and other compensation is-
sues further complicate the matter.229  Another complication is the 
participation in public hearings.  To some extent, the effectiveness 
of public consultation rests upon input from industry groups and 
civil society.  Regarding the former, while general observation re-
veals that industry associations as a whole have become more in-
fluential in shaping China’s public policies through various 
routes,230 there are still constraints on the autonomy of these indus-
                                                   
226  See Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 220, at 13. 
227  Liu Xiao-mei (刘小妹), Gongzhong Canyu Xingzheng Lifa De Lilun Sikao 
(公众参与行政立法的理论思考) [On Public Participation in Administrative Legis-
lation], Xingzheng Faxue Yanjiu (行政法学研究2007年第2期第45页) [2 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 40, 45 (2007)]. 
228  See Paler, supra note 165, at 317.  An interesting development, as Horley 
pointed out, is that both central and local governments have tapped into new 
technologies by conducting notice and comment via the Internet.  In a way, this 
can reduce the administrative and financial burdens of holding public hearings.  
See Jamie P. Horsley, Public Participation in the People’s Republic: Developing a More 
Participatory Governance Model in China, in THE SEARCH FOR DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY IN CHINA 289, 299 (2010). 
229  Id. 
230  See Guosheng Deng & Scott Kennedy, Big Business and Industry Association 
Lobbying in China: The Paradox of Contrasting Styles, 63 CHINA J. 101, 113 (2010) (il-
lustrating the effects of industry associations on public policy in China). 
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try groups.231  According to Stephanie Weil, even when industry 
groups in certain areas, e.g., the software industry, enjoy greater 
room to act on behalf of their members, their autonomy is never-
theless limited “as the government forbids absolute freedom in in-
terest articulation.”232  These obstacles to independence can argua-
bly undermine the role of industry stakeholders in the public 
consultation process.  Similarly, despite the growing number of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) over the past few dec-
ades233 and their increasingly crucial role in certain areas such as 
the environment, education, public health, and care of the disad-
vantaged,234 the development of NGOs in China is still in a nascent 
stage in terms of scale and capacity when compared to its Western 
counterparts.235  Given the political climate, generally NGOs oper-
ate in a repressed setting, with many of their activities falling un-
der the oversight of the government.236  In 2016, China passed the 
Law on the Management of Foreign NGOs, tightening its control 
over the conduct of overseas NGOs237 and rendering it problematic 
for international NGOs to gain a foothold in the nation.  The over-
all atmosphere may generate these chilling effects, thereby inhibit-
ing NGOs from actively participating in public consultation.238 
                                                   
231  See SCOTT KENNEDY, THE BUSINESS OF LOBBYING IN CHINA (2005) (discussing 
the influence of industry groups in the Chinese government’s decision-making 
process). 
232  STEFANIE WEIL, LOBBYING AND FOREIGN INTERESTS IN CHINESE POLITICS 77 
(2017);  see also id. at 45. 
233  See generally, ANDREAS EDELE, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN 
CHINA (2005). 
234  See Kerry Brown, China’s Challenges: Civil Society, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb. 14, 
2001), http://thediplomat.com/2011/02/civil-society/ [https://perma.cc/DD2Y-
8QVA] (describing NGOs' roles in Chinese society). 
235  See generally Shawn Shieh (谢世宏) & Amanda Brown-Inz (毕彦如), 
Zhongguo Gongyi NGO Gailan (中国公益 NGO 概览) [China Public Welfare NGO 
Overview], ZHONGGUO FAZHAN JIANBAO (中国发展简报 [CHINA DEV. BRIEF] (Jan. 14, 
2013), 
http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.org.cn/upload/userfiles/files/NGO%20Dir
ectory-3-26.pdf. [https://perma.cc/J2DR-853Q]. 
236  See Michael M. Gunter, Jr. & Ariane C. Rosen, Two-Level Games of Interna-
tional Environmental NGOs in China, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 270 (2012) (analyz-
ing the role of international environmental NGOs within China). 
237  Jingwai fei zhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa (境外非政府组织管理
办法) [Law on the Administration of Activities of Overseas Non-Governmental 
Organizations within the Territory of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. National People’s Cong., Apr. 28, 2016, effective Jan. 1, 2017). 
238  See, e.g., Minxin Pei, China’s Repression of Civil Society Will Haunt It, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug 5, 2008),  https://www.ft.com/content/46316820-6232-
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Second, while there have been endeavors to manage the myri-
ad conflicts that may jeopardize China’s legal system by reducing 
the number of ministries239 and strengthening the rulemaking 
power of the National People’s Congress against the State Council 
and local governments,240 interagency coordination remains a sig-
nificant hurdle.  In the area of energy policy, for instance, the deci-
sion-making paradigm is rather fragmented, with “over a dozen 
powerful players at the national level.”241  One of the most notable 
examples is the food safety governance system, where some four-
teen agencies were involved in regulatory activities as of early 
2013,242 a situation that was acknowledged as a crucial problem by 
the State Council’s Food Safety Supervision System Plan for 2012–
2017.243  Such a fragmented regulatory environment poses great 
challenges to interagency coordination, creates blind areas for 
which agencies deny responsibility, and perpetuates loopholes in 
routine control.244  Although the 2009 Food Safety Law and the 
2015 Amendment attempted to address interagency coordination 
deficits at various levels, the current state of affairs—multiple 
agencies merely organized in a loosely coordinated system with 
                                                                                                                   
11dd-9ff9-000077b07658 [https://perma.cc/CBD6-QN6L] (arguing that despite 
the explosion of the NGOs in China, “perhaps about 10 per cent of them can be 
considered genuine NGOs in the western sense.”). 
239  See Peerenboom, Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the PRC, su-
pra note 120, at 207 (noting reduction of number of ministries as possible solution 
to some conflicts in China's legal system). 
240  See Paler, supra note 165, at 318 (describing attempts to solve challenges in 
China's legal system through increasing the power of the National People's Con-
gress). 
241  CHEN GANG, CHINA’S CLIMATE POLICY 33 (1st ed. 2012). 
242  Yongning Wu & Yan Chen, Food Safety in China, 67 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & 
COMMUNITY HEALTH 478, 478–79 (2013). 
243  See M. Melinda Meador & Jie Ma, The Food Safety Management System in 
China, USDA FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERV., (2013) 
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/The%20Food%20Saf
ety%20Management%20System%20in%20_Beijing_China%20-
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_4-26-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EYV-5TR9] 
(providing overview of China's food governance system). 
244  See Ching-Fu Lin, Outsource Power, Import Safety? Challenges and Opportu-
nities of the U.S.-China Food Safety Regulatory Cooperation, 72(1) FOOD & DRUG L. J. 
32, 41–42 (2017) (illustrating challenges of China's food governance system);  see 
also NEIL COLLINS & JÖRN-CARSTEN GOTTWALD, THE CHINESE MODEL OF THE 
REGULATORY STATE, HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (David Levi-Faur 
ed., 2011) (providing overview and challenges of China's food governance sys-
tem); see generally FRANCIS SNYDER, FOOD SAFETY LAW IN CHINA: MAKING 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 108–79 (2015). 
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overlapping competences, regulating different sections of the en-
tire food supply chain—remains a challenge.245  
Third, effective implementation of regulatory coherence is con-
tingent upon a well-functioning and independent judiciary, which 
serves to review administrative actions, enforce the law, and pro-
vide appropriate remedies.  The problem of law enforcement is 
very serious indeed, and the gap between written and enforced 
rules remains significant.246  The court does not have formal au-
thority to review, let alone revoke, legislation or regulations; ra-
ther, it can merely engage in a limited and indirect form of “judi-
cial review” when the judge applies and interprets relevant 
legislation and/or regulations in individual cases.247  Additionally, 
neither the Administrative Litigation Law nor the Administrative 
Reconsideration Law grants citizens the right to bring a case before 
the court to challenge certain administrative actions.248  To our 
knowledge, there has not been a case in which a court actually re-
viewed legislation or a regulation and revoked it based on the cri-
teria of regulatory coherence, such as the lack of a duly performed 
RIA, transparency, or public consultation.  However, it should be 
noted that at the administrative level, the State Council has in place 
a “filing and review system” that establishes detailed procedures 
for active monitoring and coordination of regulations and rules so 
as to resolve conflicts between them.249  Given the vast amount of 
                                                   
245  See Lin, supra note 244. 
246  See Xin Chunying, What Kind of Judicial Power Does China Need? 1 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 58, 61 (2003) (discussing the failures of China’s judicial system);  see also 
MICHAEL A. SANTORO, CHINA 2020: HOW WESTERN BUSINESS CAN—AND SHOULD—
INFLUENCE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE COMING DECADE 54 (2009) (dis-
cussing western business' role in improving the efficacy of China's judicial sys-
tem). 
247  See generally Hand, supra note 173. 
248  See generally ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION LAW 
170–73 (Mingan Jiang ed., 6th ed., 2015). 
249  The State Council established a separate filing and review system.  The 
State Council mandated the reporting of rules in 1987, but it did not establish de-
tailed procedures for review work until it issued the Provisions on Filing of Regu-
lations and Rules in 1990 (“1990 Filing Provisions”).  The 1990 Filing Provisions 
set out the scope of local regulations and rules to be reported, established the State 
Council Legislative Affairs Bureau as the principal office responsible for filing and 
review work, and set out procedures and standards for reporting and review.  See 
Fagui Guizhang Bei’an Guiding (法规规章备案规定) [Provisions on the Filing of 
Regulations and Rules] (promulgated by St. Council, Feb. 18, 1990, effective Feb. 
18, 1990);  see also Hand, supra note 173, at 162–63 (describing the 1990 Filing Pro-
visions). 
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local regulations, autonomous regulations, and rules filed, the State 
Council—without rigorous external scrutiny and pressure—has 
not delivered effective review and coordination, especially when it 
has suffered from serious “capacity problems.”250  On the other 
hand, the State Council may, upon request submitted by a provin-
cial, autonomous region and municipal governments, approve the 
request and consider major issues concerning the application and 
interpretation of legislation as well as administrative regulations 
and rules.251  In addition, governmental organizations, companies, 
civil society groups, and individuals may submit a “proposal” (ra-
ther than a “challenge”) to the State Council or responsible authori-
ties in provincial and autonomous regional governments in cases 
in which the rules at issue may conflict with statutes or the Consti-
tution.252  Nevertheless, the central review mechanism has only re-
sponded to these proposals in extremely rare instances.253  In any 
event, such review work has not been conducted in a systematic 
manner,254 and its effectiveness relies solely upon the discretion of 
                                                   
250  The NPCSC and State Council did not have the organizational capacity to 
review the flood of legislation that lower-level organs filed annually, much less 
discipline organs that failed to report legislation or resolve difficult conflicts un-
der the existing framework.  The State Council office responsible for filing and re-
view had only twenty staff members and was forced to abandon active review of 
all filed legislation.  Instead, it decided to review legislation only when other state 
organs or citizens complained about conflicts.  See Hand, supra note 173, at 163;  
see also Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 718 
(1994) (discussing the NPCSC);  Yahong Li, The Law-making Law: A Solution to the 
Problems of the Chinese Legislative System? 30 H.K. L. J. 120, 124–25 (2000) (arguing 
that the core issue of law-making in China is how to divide legislative power be-
tween the center and the states). 
251  See Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative 
Regulations, supra note 151, art. 33. 
252  See Legislation Law, supra note 144, art. 90;  Regulations on Procedures 
for the Formulation of Rules, supra note 152, art. 35. 
253  Some scholars have highlighted the 2003 Zhigang Sun incident as a 
landmark case where the State Council has responded to the proposal.  See gener-
ally Zhang Qianfan & Huang Yue, From Constitution to Constitutionalism:  the Histo-
ry, Status Quo, and Future of the Constitutional Review in Mainland China, in 2006 
Liangan Si Di Falv Fazhan-Shangce (2006兩岸四地法律發展-上冊) [LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA, HONG KONG, MACAU, AND TAIWAN IN 2006, Te-
chung Tang & Peng-Hsiang Wang eds., 2006], Vol. 1, at 45.  But see Hand, supra 
note 173, at 142.  As Hand observed in 2013, the central review mechanism has 
never responded to these proposals. 
254  See Jue Huang, Explanations on the Proposed Legislation Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CHINA 225–26 (Buyun Li et al, 2006) 
(discussing sporadic review of conflict proposals by the State Council and provin-
cial and regional authorities). 
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the supervising authority and, ultimately, the will of the Party.  
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The last few decades have witnessed many initiatives across 
various domestic and international institutions in response to 
mushrooming regulatory-based trade barriers.  Among the efforts 
to balance regulatory autonomy and international cooperation, 
regulatory coherence appears fairly promising according to a bot-
tom-up rationalization of the domestic regulatory environment.  
Led by the United States, recent megaregional agreements have in-
corporated some core elements of regulatory coherence, further 
expanding its normative diffusion as a new global norm.  Yet the 
global entrenchment of regulatory coherence is, in our view, con-
tingent upon the capacity and the inclination of emerging econo-
mies, most notably, China.  While China’s decades-long institu-
tional reforms have reshaped its legal infrastructure in a manner 
that is formalistically aligned with good regulatory practices, its 
PTAs highlight a lack of political will to assume a full commitment 
beyond its domestic reign.  Because this experimental approach re-
flects China’s dependence on trial-and-error in other areas, the 
fundamental challenge rests upon the rule of law, democratic ac-
countability, and political reforms, which may perpetuate rather 
than alleviate obstacles to China’s future advancement toward 
global regulatory coherence. 
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